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March 27 2016


How To Fix The Force Awakens


UPDATE: The response to this essay has been overwhelming. A small legion of fans have crafted a professional re-cut of TFA implementing much of my proposal. You can download it here (DVD) (720p) (1080p).

I think I’ve figured out how to salvage The Force Awakens. Don’t get me wrong, it’s a good movie, a damn fun and refreshing movie, but it’s widely acknowledge to still have deep problems, especially in the second half. Surprisingly there’s basically one change that I think could have turned it into a great movie.

And no, I’m not talking about R2-D2’s random map bit. Yes the whole map-to-Luke mcguffin was kinda forced, but JJ could have easily focused in on some part of R2 after BB-8 leaves him and let a small light start blinking to remove the perceived arbitrariness of his later awakening. That’s trivial to solve and will probably be done in a special edition.

No, I’m talking a structural change, a plot change: The New Republic senate shouldn’t have been destroyed until just before the end of the film.

What if, in the final battle, Starkiller Base wasn’t gratuitously firing on a tiny little rinky-dink Resistance base they could have as easily just bombed, but on the New Republic itself? And then it succeeded. Sure our heroes still manage to destroy the New Order’s superweapon, but they do so after the major damage has been done. With this delay the emotional emphasis changes. They fail to save the day. They merely survive to slink off in a suddenly changed galaxy, and what hope they manage to scrounge from defeat becomes all the more desperate.

The critical moment goes something like this: Han confronts Ben, the star is finally drained away to nothing and darkness covers them, Kylo kills Han, Chewie howls and shoots Kylo. Leia is slammed. Rey and Finn fire their blasters in despair, that’s when we see Starkiller Base finally fire, casting everything in red and orange to match Kylo’s saber. Finn and Rey scramble into the snow blown up from the firing and we cut to the magical hyperlaser slamming into the Senate and destroying the Republic’s mighty fleet. Leia crumples. Rey and Finn are scrambling through the snow, Chewie trying to escape the troopers, everything is in tatters, and that’s when Chewie blows the charges, Poe flies in past an escaping Kylo and blows the regulator. Then Kylo confronts Rey and Finn and everything returns to the normal trajectory we saw on screens.

Why is this better? Well because it breaks the A New Hope story to a significant degree and double-emphasizes the loss of Han, making the film more dark. Imagine if Yavin IV had actually been destroyed before Luke had managed to blow the Death Star. It also swings the otherwise largely indiscernible political context back into focus in a way that actually works. In the first cut of the film JJ had Leia send a representative to the New Republic to argue on her behalf that the First Order was a pressing threat. JJ was right to take that out of the final film because it involved us randomly cutting away from our new heroes over to Leia before she shows up on Takodana and has her perfect introduction with Han. However what was lost with these cut scenes is any remote understanding of the wider political situation, which makes TFA’s conflict feel like a forced rehash. Suddenly the Empire’s back and the Rebellion is too, and oh there’s this other thing for half a second.

With the destruction of Hosnian Prime moved back to the final act there’s room for the political situation to be spelled out first.

There’s really no point in having the Hosnian system be destroyed while our heroes are on Takodana. Rey has her force-vision and runs away, Finn is about to depart and then the version of The Force Awakens we got has two things happen at once: Starkiller Base fires and Kylo’s forces descend on Maz’s castle. Only one of those is really necessary. All Finn needs as motivation to turn around and seek Rey is the First Order attacking Maz’s castle and thus directly putting her in danger.


Further the scene where Finn and others look up and see distant exploding planets has widely been noted as profoundly insulting to the audience. Star Wars has an explicit speed of light and that doesn’t let you immediately see what happens on planets half a galaxy away by merely looking up in the sky on a different planet in a different system. This scene is hot garbage. JJ has done this kind of shit before (putting Spock on another distant planet where somehow he can see Vulcan be destroyed in the sky with his bare eyes), and he got hate for it. JJ doing it again is just flagrant disrespect.

Star Wars is far from a hard SF franchise — it has sound in space and wizards — but a major part of why fans love it so dearly is in its world-building. Star Wars would be a but a pale fraction of what it is without compendiums explaining every species and vehicle. Attention to consistency and detail is a critical part of respecting your fans by showing you love the galaxy too. Star Wars is not serious science fiction by any stretch of the imagination, but neither is it something as halfassed as say Moffat’s Doctor Who, a campy fairy tale that doesn’t bother with consistency but focuses on cute momentary spectacle that almost immediately sours the moment you turn a couple neurons to think about it.

Instead of the destruction of the Hosnian system you could simply have Hux give his speech and use Starkiller to start draining a star. (This would also remove the slightly confusing bit where Starkiller has a star and daylight when firing for the first time.) The look of the base beginning to drain a star is profound enough. The planet is eating a star! Hux says they will power up with it and fire across the galaxy! There’s no story reason the whole process should only take twenty minutes in-universe. Indeed dragging out the draining of the star over the entire last acts helps add to a sense of the magnitude of this superweapon and how it’s different than the Death Stars.

This disruption — the beginning of the draining of a star — could be sufficient for the Resistance to take note (“massive disruptions in hyperspace”). Or Finn could be the one to relay the message about Star Killer base in reaction to Rey being taken hostage.

What this enables is scenes with Leia trying to contact the Republic to warn them. This is where the Republic refusing to deal with her and the difference between the mighty Republic and the weak Resistance can actually be shown to the audience. Leia can try to contact with a hologram and get the runaround and rejection by senators or bureaucrats. Think of her talking to a sympathetic senator who’s helped shield her from other factions in the Republic and finance her little Resistance but who feels like she can do no more, and relaying Leia’s fears to the Senate would mean openly admitting being in contact with Leia. “But this superweapon could destroy the Republic!” “They’d arrest me rather than hear from you.” You could also imagine her contacting the admiral of the mighty Republic fleet — and this would be a great moment for Ackbar to appear and actually be a character, someone sympathetic, but tied down by his leadership role. And maybe he does get a few ships away, or presses for evacuation, but it’s too late in the final act. Alternately you could have Leia send a delegate to try and convince people to evacuate, and ultimately have her die on the planet, after periodically cutting to her efforts to save folks during the rest of last acts.


Leia thus emerges more clearly as a Cassandra character and her Resistance is situated clearly against a New Republic that is happy to keep a treaty with the remnants of the Empire. And then the end of the film involves her both being right, to hideous consequences, as well as losing Han.

Even with everything else the same, this makes for a very different movie than A New Hope, indeed it blurs aspects of both A New Hope and The Empire Strikes Back. The loss of the mentor isn’t in the middle as with Obiwan’s death, it’s at the end. The deep catastrophe isn’t in the middle as with Alderaan, but at the end. Our heroes survive and The First Order is impeded, but it’s more of an Empire Strikes Back sort of situation. Except even worse, more of a Revenge of the Sith sort of situation because everything has changed and all the good guys have left is hope. People run up to greet the survivors, but there is no cheering victory. The “find Luke” ending is reminiscent more of the “find Han and that bounty hunter” ending of ESB, but it also becomes all the more meaningful, because we have a more immediate sense of him being truly needed.

This single plot change doesn’t make The Force Awakens a completely novel experience, it remains a hash of things that have worked before, but it mixes things up further than the direct retread of A New Hope we got. And it provides a good way to actually demonstrate the political context at an appropriate time, without slogging down the film or arbitrarily interrupting the early adventures of Finn & Rey.

What’s also astonishing about this change is how little screentime it would change. Some shots like Kylo and Hux watching the first firing would have to be changed to them watching the star being sucked down. You’d get a couple extra minutes of Leia or her delegate trying to warn the Republic, trying to get people to evacuate. And you’d change some dialog in the Resistance base and move the shot of the Hosnian destruction to the moments between Kylo killing Han and Poe making his trench run. You could have Starkiller fire as viewed by the X-wing pilots, but then Poe notices the hole Chewie blew in the energy regulator. And in this version there’s still enough energy remaining in Starkiller from the sun after firing that it can be released, engulfing the base.

(Notice further that you can keep the shots of Han and Finn looking up, but pair those shots with the descent of the First Order ships. Indeed, in any case, this is something I’d strongly encourage being done in a special edition to remove the whole “we can instantly see another planet exploding from across the galaxy” insult.)

But despite at most adding no more than a few minutes such changes would significantly slow down the the rushed mess of the film and give it a more coherent and unified feel. From Takodana on it’s a race to save the (ungrateful and unaware) New Republic from the New Order’s superweapon. The main characters fail. And in doing so Han’s death isn’t minimized by the immediately following trivial success easily blowing up yet another death star. Similarly neither is the victory at Endor by the Rebellion seemingly cast aside. We get to see that the Galaxy has had 30 years of something resembling peace and liberalization. The victory of RtoJ isn’t already basically trashed by the time TFA opens, instead the entire film clearly and slowly lays out the rise of the First Order from a minor power to the supreme power in the galaxy and the demolishing of everything accomplished at Endor.

And this gives even more power to Rey’s fight with Kylo. Everything is freshly ruined. Her father figure has been murdered, her new friend lies possibly dead, and the New Republic has just been destroyed. Everything they were fighting against has come to pass. Poe’s pitiful squadron has been shredded. Kylo is seemingly unstoppable. And then she musters her strength, overcomes the fear and trepidation that has hounded her, calls out to the Skywalker lighsaber and it flies past Kylo into her hand. She masters her rage in a moment of absolute loss, both personal and across the galaxy, and finds clarity and serenity.

Destroying the Republic senate at the end after a long buildup would take everything good about the film and turn it up to 11.

March 20 2016


Hong Cog-a-thon, May 2016

OpenCog / Hanson Robotics hackathon and informal tutorial session
Hong Kong Science Park, May 9-20, 2016

Attention all OpenCog developers! — and all wannabe OpenCog developers with reasonable programming/CS background -

We are gathering a number of normally-scattered OpenCog and Hanson Robotics software people in Hong Kong during the period May 9-20, to

  • share know-how regarding OpenCog development — especially as regards using OpenCog for robotics, but also more generally
  • work together on increasing OpenCog functionality
  • brainstorm and discuss regarding the next phase of OpenCog improvements/extensions

The proceedings will be informal but there will also be lectures/tutorials and structured discussions.  See the Cog-a-thon wiki page for details.

If you are serious about getting deep into OpenCog development, this would  be a good chance to rapidly increase your knowledge of the system and how to work with it.  To make the most of the opportunity, you would be well  advised to run through as many hands-on OpenCog tutorials as you can beforehand; and to install the open source Hanson Robotics “simulated robot head” software stack (to be put in this repo shortly) on your laptop beforehand as well.

There is no charge for you to join us — and also no funding available to support you to  join us!   If you want to participate, you are responsible for getting yourself to Hong Kong, finding a place to sleep (the rooming houses in Chungking Mansion or Mirador Mansion are always an option if cost is an issue); and for bringing a laptop and a lot of enthusiasm for early-stage AGI work.

(Note, life will be easier if your laptop is running Linux natively.  Ubuntu or Debian  are the distros we tend to work with, but other distros are fine if you know what you’re doing.  We will be doing a bunch of stuff involving using OpenCog to control animated models in Blender, and Blender sometimes runs badly in a virtual machine, and networking in and out of a VM can be a pain.  If you are gonzo at complex VM configurations, do whatever you want, but consider yourself warned!)

There will also surely be some group social activities, to be organized fairly ad hoc: a couple nights out in Hong Kong island, and likely a day hike on the weekend in some of the beautiful Hong Kong mountains.

February 22 2016



FreedomBox 0.8 Released

January 20th, 2016

I'm pleased to announce that FreedomBox 0.8 has been released! This release comes 9 weeks after the previous release (0.7).

We did not build new images for this release. However it is available in Debian (unstable) as 2 packages, freedombox-setup 0.8 and plinth 0.8.1-1.

If you are using Freedombox 0.7, you can upgrade to 0.8. (If you have automatic upgrades enabled, this should have happened already!) But first, please read the "Known Issues" section below.

More information on this release is available on the wiki:

Major FreedomBox 0.8 Changes:

  • Added Quassel, an IRC client that stays connected to IRC networks and can synchronize multiple frontends.
  • Improved first boot user interface.
  • Fixed Transmission RPC whitelist issue.
  • Added translations for Turkish, Chinese, and Russian. Fixed and updated translations in other languages.
  • Added Monkeysphere, which uses PGP web of trust for SSH host key verification.
  • Added Let's Encrypt, to obtain certificates for domains, so that browser certificate warnings can be avoided.
  • Added repro, a SIP server for audio and video calls.
  • Allow users to set their SSH public keys, so they can login over SSH without a password.

Known Issues:

There is an issue in Plinth 0.7.x that can affect those trying to upgrade to 0.8.1. The issue happens when the manual upgrade is started (by clicking the "Upgrade now" button) and it tries to upgrade Plinth. The Plinth upgrade can fail during this manual upgrade process started through Plinth.

There are 2 workarounds for those trying to upgrade from 0.7.x: - Turn on Automatic Upgrades, and wait (up to 24 hours). Plinth will be automatically upgraded to 0.8.1, and the issue is avoided. - Or, you can SSH into the box, and run "sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade".

Thanks to all who helped to put this release together. There were several new contributors for this release. The wiki has a full list of contributors to the project:

Please feel free to join us to discuss this release on the mailing list, IRC, or on the monthly progress calls:

February 19 2016


Manipulation As Withholding

One of the most disappointing things about the anarchist community is that while we’ve widely recognized that our critique of power relations extends to interpersonal dynamics we’ve — so far — largely shied away from addressing such in concrete terms. One-on-one we often repeat accusations and condemnations of manipulation, but we’ve never sorted out precisely what manipulation is. Even in the tumblr renaissance there’s a marked tendency for the heroic young folk decrying power structures within various scenes or milieus to suddenly shy away when it comes to identifying and arguing against manipulation itself. Instead we generally mutter about how such and such example of manipulation rhymes with aspects of certain widely recognized systems of oppression. But interpersonal power dynamics are not bad merely because they reflect currently widespread shitty systems. Bespoke patterns of abuse are still abusive, regardless of whether or not we can easily shove them into categories like “racist” or “patriarchal”.

In one of the blessed signs that we are trying to work some of this out there’s been an increasing amount of explicit and sharp disagreement over what constitutes “gaslighting.” When one side argues that gaslighting is not treating someone’s beliefs as innately valid and the other side argues that it’s making/letting someone become disconnected from objective reality it’s quite clear that there’s a deep divide in philosophical foundations going on. The sort of hugely substantive split that we absolutely cannot afford to paper over but desperately need to drag into the light and hash out.

I’ve applauded these debates, but I want to go further and argue that there’s a grave philosophical chasm to be found in our definition of “manipulation” itself.

I think this Metafilter exchange teases the fracture apart quite well:

Person 1:
Please do not so as I request if there is any taint of fear or punishment if you don’t.
Please do not do as I request to buy my love, that is, hoping I will love you more if you do.
Please do not do as I request if you will feel guilty or shameful if you don’t.
And certainly do not do as I request out of any sense of duty or obligation.

Person 2:
I don’t think I’d ever do much of anything without these motivating factors.

I want to be absolutely clear: I am not advocating a nihilism on the subject of manipulation; I think that there exists a clear and concrete definition of manipulation that is quite aggressively expansive and deserves unqualified condemnation and resistance from anarchists. Person 2’s response can be read in a very nihilistic manner about motivation, and I’m certain many sociopaths & social capitalists would instinctively read it as agreeing with them that “literally everything is manipulation, it’s just that some people consider some random types of it objectionable.” I am not taking that position, but I do think the response correctly highlights just how extreme the first person’s framework is.

What’s implicit in the above list of proclamations is a condemnation of anything that’s not a direct and immediate personal desire. All the motivations presented as invalid or to be avoided — fear of negative reactions, hope to deepen love, guilt, obligation — are united by involving higher-order desires or considerations. Sure you may happen to sometimes feel an immediate desire, but these desires are often overruled or outweighed, upon rumination, by other more deeply rooted desires.

In a direct reading of this philosophy if I make a rational and honest argument appealing to your conscience — telling you that if you don’t stop playing video games and call an ambulance for me you’ll feel guilty for going against a more underlying desire when I bleed out — that would be classified as “manipulation.” But surely if you actually do deeply care about whether I live or die it’s hardly manipulative for me to help you remember that while you happen to lie in a temporary video game coma. The other terms have equally absurd implications under this frame of mind, and the reductios for them should be obvious. Are we never to act in ways we hope will deepen someone’s love for us?

You might find this a particularly uncharitable read, but there’s a long tradition of thought in the Left that breaks in this direction. An example would be the recurring claim by many Foucauldians that persuasion of any kind — including rational appeals to one’s underlying desires or values and the ramifications from them — is coercion. This syncs up well with a current of immediatism found within the ‘radical’ milieu and many youth subcultures that instinctively takes a very hands-off approach to the roots and ramifications of one’s feelings and calls that ‘autonomy.’ This is the “Thinking About One’s Desires Is Bad” philosophy that idealizes desires (like love, etc) as mere magical weather patterns that just happen to strike us whenever, and that we dare not examine closer or seek to clarify lest our understanding and agency in them diminish their ‘wildness.’ It’s closely tied to the notion that thinking about shit is dangerous because it leads to sociopathy and what differentiates us from sociopaths is not knowing, treating other people’s minds (and our own) as black boxes.

There is a very profound question here that professional philosophy as a whole has unfortunately largely ducked: which is what if you can actually map and predict someone’s responses with great accuracy, what are your ethical obligations? If you come to understand someone to the point where they cease being a black box? If interactions with them are functionally deterministic on a certain scale or within a certain context (however limited)? At that point whatever action (or inaction) you take, you’re determining what ends they move towards. This is the sort shit that creates nihilists/fascists — and non-anarchists more generally — because they instinctively define power relations / manipulation in terms of causal interplay, and since you can’t get outside causality you can’t get outside power / manipulation.

A prototypical liberal response is to react by clinging to ignorance. To say “well you don’t know!” but also “you shouldn’t know!” To basically forbid exploration. In this light “manipulation” is taken to be any situation where one person doesn’t treat the other’s thoughts or feelings as a black box. In the extreme limit this ends up rejecting things like, “hey, I know that you like baseball cards so you should probably go to the baseball card festival they’re putting on.” Or, “I feel safer with partners who are honest [and thus being honest with me will likely heighten my capacity to love you].” Both actions leverage knowledge of a person’s internal desires and contextual ramifications to change their likely behavior, even their desires. If this is manipulation then rejecting it means rejecting knowing people and/or any deduction of ramifications from desires, much less prioritization of desires.

I want to be fair: such an expansive notion of “manipulation” wouldn’t necessarily forbid literally all human interactions, but it would obviously dramatically constrain them. Far more than I think our natural concept of and objection to “manipulation” can defend.

This is usually where the average person stops in their private analysis. And it provides a good representation of the ignorance-as-egalitarianism vs intelligence-as-sociopathy assumed dichotomy that I’ve long been emphasizing underpins so damn much of people’s philosophies and our world’s institutions and ideologies. But no, I think there’s a perfectly functional way to define manipulation that doesn’t go to such absurd lengths, rejection of which is perfectly compatible — even convergent — with at the same time valuing intelligence and understanding.

Manipulation is withholding information from people in order to constrain — and thus presumably channel — their choices.

For example if you have an argument that (alone) would persuade someone to do B, but you also have an argument that might persuade them to do A, and yet you only provide them with one of the arguments then you have manipulated them. Similarly even if you haven’t found another argument beyond the one you’re presenting, if you’re working off an array of remotely relevant context that they’re not privy to and you fail to present the full context you have (so they might search within it for new or better arguments), you’re manipulating them.

Under this definition a condemnation of manipulation is straightforward in its prescription: if you can model someone in a given context quite well the way to respect their agency is to elevate them to whatever level you’re on (at least in all relevant respects).

Let’s quickly state this more rigorously for the nerds:

Take for instance two AIs that are exactly equal, if one reaches a computational conclusion earlier than the other it should be free to transmit that proof to the other, even though such a transmission utterly determines the result / course of action the other AI will take. However if one AI is larger than the other AI and can thus model it internally, the extra bits of that AI functionally represent an oracle. The ethical obligation on the AI is to augment the lesser AI with said oracle. It doesn’t matter what these extra bits are — an extra level of recursion, extra information about the environment, etc. The course of action by the bigger AI that doesn’t count as manipulation of power dynamics is to help the smaller AI enhance itself. In short: to expand agency.

Of course living breathing human beings are incredibly complicated and messy, with all kinds of subjective barriers to personal experience. No one can ever perfectly simulate another human within their own head. However there clearly are situations where this is possible to some degree — and the course of action that isn’t manipulative is the one that shares whatever information that might be relevant to another person’s life and thoughts and decisions. Which applies just as strongly for two people of more or less equal intelligence but unequal sets of knowledge.

This has been my guiding philosophy for over a decade.

Some context might be illustrative as an example (and perhaps fend off accusations of disconnect or ressentiment):

I tried to navigate high school with a moral code, refusing to do a huge array of things, and yet I accumulated some fair amount of social power and standing nonetheless. My prohibitions were far more restrictive than anyone else’s I’ve ever met. And yet I still found myself functionally manipulating people to vast degrees. One easy to explain mechanism is that I was a lot of people’s counselor and confidant — in part because I was compassionate and helpful but also because I kept their secrets. Now I never spilled people’s secrets to hurt them or discredit them or make power plays — and I wouldn’t have. But I nevertheless had said secrets. This means two things, 1) a number of people still had some lurking concern that I might spill them if they pulled shit with me, but more importantly 2) I had in many respects a better map of the world than everyone else. I knew the social landscape.

If I know that person A’s crush on person B is reciprocated, I suddenly know a lot more about the possible ramifications of normal casual actions that I might take. I may be sworn to secrecy and non-meddling by both, but when picking who to invite along with a group skipping class I can’t pretend that I’m not either increasing their likelihood of hooking up or decreasing it. I am functionally in control whether or not I want to be. The only thing that reduces my control over the situation is to increase the operating knowledge both of them have.

One quickly realizes that more obtuse manipulation through for example lying is but a subset of withholding. Lying that is immediately revealed as lying is merely joking. It is the one-two punch of changing the landscape by introducing new data (“Jane says she wants you to go”) but not the relevant completion of that data (the single extra bit that clarifies “this is a lie”) that effects manipulation. And joking that depends on a persistent lack of clarity over whether or not someone is joking can be easily seen to replicate power through differentials of awareness. For example teasing that’s harmless or convivial between bros who are in on the unseriousness can become functionally abusive when directed at someone who isn’t on the “in”. Even if the bro doesn’t consciously mean to leverage power or ignorantly assumes the person on the out will get it, the information differential creates a power dynamic anyway. A much more evolved form of this is visible in meme ecosystems online today, where the function of in-jokes has been stripped bare and weaponized. New memes — in the sense of in-jokes — are constantly created and dispersed to reveal the lines of association and reinforce hierarchies of information access (that overlap in complex meshes and constantly shift). Similarly, exploiting someone’s subrational instincts or cognitive fallacies is almost always a matter of withholding your awareness of such processes and what you consider the likely impact of your actions.

Of course actual manipulation in the real world typically involves a vast contextual network built from the sort of primitive dynamics described here, and often interweaves in subtle ways with contexts of physical coercion, and we might want to classify hardwired processes like some forms of PTSD that one has no conscious agency in as directly physical forms of control, but the point remains that proactive honesty would make manipulation itself impossible, even if other forms of control remain to be tackled.

Now I’m not suggesting that our world isn’t a complicated place — or less euphemistically a horrific dystopia — where utilizing power relations isn’t sometimes called for, even by those of us committed to their ultimate abolition. Punching a cop in the face is, obviously, a power relation. And privacy, secrecy, etc are quite often functionally necessary, especially in movements of resistance. There can be good reason to avoid letting our boss know about our politics or even our friends know about all our kinks, if only for politeness’ sake. Similarly while the hierarchies of information access that drive ingroup/outgroup dynamics are corrosive to rationality or intellectual vigilance, they can be quite useful for the oppressed or in defensive situations more broadly. There are thousands of diverse ways in which navigating even basic human interactions involve manipulation. But anarchists are not marxists, enthusiastic or untroubled by embracing power as a means, we believe in ferreting out even the most subtle of power dynamics, and that while ends and means are deeply interconnected and we cannot and should not act entirely as saints, we should nevertheless strive to build as best we can an image of the ends we would like to see. Namely, a world without power relations.

While strategy and pragmatism are surely called for, our lives must be coherent with that ultimate goal or value. And that means a pressure or general tendency against manipulation in any form, barring limited and painfully necessary exceptions. But yes, as a default, you can freely persuade, you can freely argue, you can freely influence other people. But you have to be proactively honest. Telling them not just the stuff that cuts in your direction, but — where possible — the stuff that goes against, and generally all the stuff that might be remotely relevant to them. You have to push back against any common cognitive fallacies they might be otherwise subject to — including the influence of often unconscious dynamics like your own social standing or creeping halo effect.

The world is a complicated messy place, we never know anything absolutely, much less precisely what others would be better informed and empowered with greater agency by knowing, but the complexity of the world is no excuse for failing to engage with it. And in many situations we can judge or know these things quite well.


The Organic Emergence of Property from Reputation

For centuries radicals have debated alternative property systems, and I’m glad we’re having these conversations. But what has been consistently disappointing about them is how little they generally seek to explore the underlying roots of “property” itself. To be sure, all sides provide ethical arguments for why their system is superior that make moves in this direction, but the debate happens largely as though each of these systems were politicians or platforms. Rather than illuminate why we are having our disagreements and whether they can be bypassed, the various positions slide into mere competition by presenting their own positive qualities and the downsides of their competitors.

The approach I encourage as an alternative is one where we don’t exclusively compare prefigurative endpoints — final universal systems — but instead focus on the means by which such social norms are generated from the bottom up. As anarchists it’s silly pageantry to write policy papers settling on a single and precise blueprint — as if we might debate it on some floor and raise enough voters to our side to enact it. Instead our goal should be to provide a better account of the dynamics and possibilities inherently at play so that individuals might have more tools and knowledge at their disposal to build solutions for themselves.

The question is not so much what property system might finally be settled on, but how it should emerge.

Before starting I want to underline something Kevin Carson touched on briefly, but warrants underlining for more communistic readers. There’s a history of semantic baggage around the term “property” and many communists prefer to re-label things like personal toothbrushes “possessions” instead. But “possession” is always a matter of degree and 1800s era distinctions between for example things and things that help make other things (commodities versus capital) seem very silly and arbitrary, a highly contextual framework that is rapidly dissolving with modern technological developments. I’m happy to speak this niche language of “possession” in certain settings, but on the whole I find it a misleading distraction and I will follow Kevin’s lead — as well as the rest of the English speaking world’s — in defining “property” at its most basic as any title granting primacy in determining the use of a physical object.

It should be blindingly obvious that such titles can be occasionally useful. But just to cover all the bases and to provide a firm foundation I will briefly present the case to satiate our more extremely communistic readers. The possible scope of communistic systems that attempt to put literally everything under the purview of “the community” should not be underestimated, but even the most radical communist proposals usually admit some degree of property title as we’ve defined it here.

Rare indeed is the extreme communist position that literally all things should be owned globally, with no capacity for local communities to exercise exclusive control over some of their own resources. Suffice to say if one community has a veto over the uses of something and another community does not then there is some kind of property system at play. Unless someone in New York gets a vote on the uses of a toothpick in East Timor and vice versa there’s a property system going on, whatever the limits and however informal, to recognize specialization and relevance. The actors may be “communities” but there is nevertheless some kind of system denoting and determining the boundaries and titles of what those communities claim.

As a second example, individual autonomy generally means being granted veto over the function and arrangement of one’s own body. The problem is that there’s no philosophically clean line between bodies and tools. Hair, glasses, wheelchairs, crutches, etc. Even our houses and vehicles can be seen as extensions of us, in terms of identity, causal closeness, as well as basic bodily function and survival. We’re all already transhuman and as we grow ever more so this blurring or queering of the categories of “body” and “tool” will become all the more inescapable. We send signals from our brains out to our fingers and expect them to move, and our fingers send signals out into our laptop and we expect its structures too to move the way we want them to. Many geeks today have taken to referring to our phones and computers as “exocortexes” to reflect how deeply we integrate with them and see them as extensions of our selves, our will, body and mind. Similarly the disabled often see implants or prosthetics as integral parts of themselves, as extensions of their bodies. It would be ethically repugnant to put the continued function of an artificial heart under the purview of a community rather than exclusively the control of the individual in which it resides. But it’s also clear that there are no clean lines to be drawn; some things serve a more tool-like role and others more body-like role, often smoothly transitioning in degrees between one another.

Further we often grant people exclusive purview to fiddle with a thing as a response to realities of subjective experience and knowledge. Our thoughts, desires, and contexts are rich complex things — in many regards ultimately unknowable with any precision to those outside our skulls, much less those a continent away. When working on a project like a sculpture or new device it’s often far more efficient to just let an individual work on their own, without having to justify every step or choice in a committee. We say, “It’s your block of marble or circuit board” and allow them to tinker with it exclusively.

All of this justification for the most simple and basic versions of “property” possible may seem superfluous but my point here is that they’re practical concerns grounded in realities as simple and fundamental as information and processing.

The assignment of titles to physical items is an inescapable concern — but for practical reasons. Concerns that are deeply dependent in many respects on context.

The very idea of “land” as being fundamentally distinct from say fungible commodities would make no sense in the context of outer space when we’re building ad hoc or personal biomes from melted asteroids and the volume of the void is unlimited. On the other end of things, systems that critically assume the possibility of homesteading make no sense in a highly populated information-age world where every cubic inch is constantly cataloged and monitored.

Popular conceptions of what “laying fallow” might signify could change rapidly alongside broader accelerations in cultural, technological, and economic dynamics. One moment leaving my backyard empty for a year might seem perfectly reasonable, the next moment the public might consider it an intolerable and horrific waste. I’m what? Using it to grow some grass? I haven’t done anything with the matter in it or the precious limited surface area it represents in nearly 30 million seconds! That’s unfathomable waste! Please someone, anyone dump some nanogoo on it and do something with it!

There’s a lot of talk that “communities will settle on norms” but nevermind how that settling is supposed to happen. How are these standards supposed to smoothly evolve and update to reflect new conditions or contexts? Precisely how does that work? And god forbid we critically interrogate the very idea of discrete “communities” as though an anarchist society would just settle into villages that constitute a single community rather than an incredibly complicated mesh of social relations and networks with no clear boundaries.

There’s been a tendency in this debate, particularly in market anarchist discourse, to just chuck everything at “the community” or “polycentric legal systems” and hope that move resolves the issue.

This is in some ways on the right track, but it’s not enough because appealing to formalized collective decision-making or arbitration apparatuses in many respects just pushes the buck back. How do the codes of behavior that these systems judge arise? How can these social codes be dynamically or organically changed or updated as context changes? What if it changes dramatically?

Many in this discussion have appealed at least partially to “labor mixing” as the foundation of legitimate property title. But this justification is deeply problematic.

What does it mean to mix labor? “Improvement” is at core subjective. “Labor” itself is at core subjective. If I walk into a large wild field and rearrange a few twigs or — alternatively — do copious gardening repositioning wild plants to shift the layout slightly, either in ways that I think “better channels the spiritual energy” of the field, it may look like exactly the same sort of wild field to virtually everyone else. But it might be the case that in this new configuration its utility to me has increased dramatically. I might derive immense satisfaction from the new arrangement. In the case where I only moved a few sticks (rather than breaking my back doing gardening that no one else will perceive much change from), I might nevertheless claim that I exerted immense psychological or mental effort figuring out which sticks and how to move them.

In a market one may try to just go off of “market value” but it’s not proven that there would be any singular metric of such in a truly freed market — the currency situation might be incredibly complex, fractal and overlapping, in no way mirroring the current cash nexus. “The market” might possibly be a complex organic ecosystem, not immediately globally clearing and with no clear equilibrium point for an arbitration court to go off of. Indeed arbiters or community bodies or whatever may not overlap with currencies at all. But again even if we could settle on a single notion of value improvement or even labor expended, it’s not clear how much should be requisite for unowned materials to get titles assigned to them. Titles in a legal system are relatively binary things. Either you have title to something or you don’t.

Indeed it’s worth significantly challenging the philosophical assumptions underlying the assignment of ownership according to work expended on something or degree market value improved. Having poked at something in the past is certainly not the same thing as it currently existing as an extension of one’s body or as a focus of one’s attention and interest. You might care a lot about something that you’re working on and then not really at all afterward. You may never structurally change something, you may never improve the market value of something, and nevertheless critically depend upon it. There’s plenty that can be said about ecology here, never mind the fetishization of “work” itself. Why should we start from a perspective of how much energy is exerted rather than how much desire is satiated?

At the end of the day the focus on labor-mixing seems to bundle in a defense of property (and markets) grounded ultimately in a rather modern ethos of “I am due recompense for working” rather than the more foundational ethical concern for “what arrangement best improves the lot of everyone.” The most persuasive justifications for property (and markets) is that they improve the lives of all — that they’re the most pragmatic ways to navigate concerns of bodily autonomy, subjective desires, and scarcity of resources. This is, after all, why no sane or ethical person would defend “intellectual property” — since there’s no practical need for ideas to be made scarce, no coordination problems to full communism in information. Focusing on labor-mixing as the primary certifier of ownership implicitly appeals to a tit-for-tat sense of “justice” or demand to personal recompense for work done, rather than a cosmopolitan and universalist drive to better all. This is a significant philosophical distinction over what we’re even trying to speak of with “ethics” and thus ethical justifications for various property systems. And yet it has been passed over silently in this back and forth.

But on a more practical level, the classic reductio of labor-mixing can be immediately seen with a group heading out to a deserted island or planet and the moment they get there one of them uses robots to till all the land. Does that person now justly reign as supreme king forever? Markets can exist with such unequal distributions that they just entirely replicate the existence of the state. Even Rothbard conceded that if you “privatized” title to the possessions of a communist state that owns everything into the hands of a single person or just a few literally nothing would have meaningfully changed.

In ragging so heavily on labor-mixing I’m implicitly to some degree asking that we reground our analyses to start with “bodily extension” as a more important or fundamental paradigm than the more nebulous labor-mixing — but I don’t want to pretend that there are ultimately any clean resolutions there either. If a robber baron networks thousands of factories’ cybernetic systems directly into his nervous system that hardly trumps all other concerns on the legitimacy of property titles. Indeed no ethical argument for property of yet satisfactorily resolves the question of where our bodies end without making an arbitrary move, indeed it’s unclear that there should even be such a clean binary. All definitions of bodies much less what constitutes the “facts” of who possesses what are socially constructed as well as individually subjective. They all require input parameters derived from culture and from contexts that can change fluidly. It would be a shame to enshrine rules or systems incapable of keeping up with those contextual changes.

The language I’ve used to present reductios and counterexamples deliberately baits dismissal by sneers of “science fiction” — but all our revolutionary aspirations are inherently science fiction and just as unlikely to be realized in the near future. As self-professed radicals our concern is the roots of things, the fundamentals, and this requires pressing our conceptual frameworks into extreme contexts to see what breaks down outside the effective region our approximations are good within.

Of course property itself need not extend to all possible contexts. We can surely dream of worlds where no version of ‘property’ would be particularly useful. But these effective boundaries to the concept are highly illustrative. Property loses all relevance in world without scarcity. But it also loses relevance in the absence of clearly definable individuals.

It is the current individualization of humanity into discrete and localized neural networks with drastically limited connections between them that is most fundamentally necessary for the concept of property titles exist. There are individual minds or agents acting in a physical world — literally nothing else need be said about the extent of our bodies, how we act in the world, or the nature of our interests and projects.

And here lies a blinding theoretical clarity: Our evaluation of other individuals and their evaluations of us are prior in a deep way to everything else. Such evaluations — our relationships, impressions, trust, and intentions with regard to one another — cannot be alienated from us or overruled. At least not without breaking the very Cartesian individualization and subjective experience our skulls presently impose that makes property useful. Reputation is firmly prior to any other contextual consideration. This much should be obvious and it may seem a trivial point, but it continually astonishes me how quickly our discourses leap past this primordial reality. As if the ethical frameworks we speak in terms of have no more aspiration than the most provisional or situational.

Every social norm, every standard, ultimately originates in the detentes between individuals. Society itself is a fabric of social relationships. We reach settlements, optimal meta-agreements through a rich network of relations, not a single deliberative body — there is no and has never been any “The Community”. Things quickly get complicated and thorny once you add in physical and historical context. But property titles are, at root, just an agreement to respect each other. What scariest about this to many is that property is not a single collective contract, or even a contract with the kind of hardness and permanency possible when grounded in systemic coercion. It is instead an organically emergent mesh of agreements, constantly being mediated and pressured.

Even the Marxist housemates agree not to use each others’ toothbrushes because this is an obviously optimal arrangement, an optimal détente. But there is no single magical ledger in the sky keeping track of everything. Property, in its most basic and inarguable forms, emerges bottom-up. And just as a market can settle into a perfectly cleared equilibrium — it often won’t.

People can and will disagree over property titles, not because they are mistaken in pursuit of some platonically existing ideal, but because they simply disagree.

If we arrive on a deserted island and I manage to get my robotic drones to till the entire island first you would surely not respect my claim to own all the accessible land. No matter how Lockean you claim to be.

And that’s great. Instead of partially obscuring the issue by assuming that we’ll always establish polycentric legal systems with massively overlapping meshes of formal mediators and conflict adjudicators, and then these will come to consensus on a single global and canonical ledger of property titles, we should be clear that the roots of any anarchist system lie in the agents involved. Disagreements have to ultimately be settled in terms of our relationships with others, our complicated intentionality, goodwill, and trust.

Our relationships with one another, what can be termed, if you feel like it, “the reputation market,” will sometimes be perturbed by differences and require the transmission of signals to return to a tolerable détente or equilibrium for all parties. Theft can be a valid signal. If everyone starts walking off with my goods because they’ve ceased to be sufficiently reputationally incentivised in the broader community or society to respect my monopoly, well that might be a good thing.

If — whether through distortions brought about by systemic violence as in our present world or just some kind of evolutionary misstep from a free and egalitarian state — a “market” has somehow grown so dysfunctional as to see starvation while bread is stocked in plenty then I will happily shout alongside the famous market anarchist Voltairine de Cleyre, “Take bread!” And I’ll personally help you bust a window or two to do it.

It’s long been pointed out that, in the absence of a statist police system that effectively subsidizes the wealthy, it’s easier to steal from one safe containing a billion dollars than from a billion safes containing one dollar. The reassuring idea has been that while the rich might get around this by hiring tons of security guards to protect their giant silos of gold, at that point they’re hemorrhaging funds to pay for security. But such examples take an implicitly cavalier attitude towards violence, one that many social anarchists are rightfully frightened of. If we broadly accept the existence of people taking money to wield violence in defense of some claim… that introduces many severe dangers to say the least. The better approaches have been to treat violence, even “defensive”, as something to accept very very hesitantly. Instead the emphasis is that contracts and the like should only be enforced via diffuse reputation. Working to build social organisms and instincts in a direction where freedom-of-association can function as sufficient censor or sanction. The next logical step along this path is to go from treating written contracts this way to property titles themselves.

Wealth is in many respects subjective. What might most deliriously satisfy one person (having a guitar and a pond to write poems beside) can be very different from what would best satisfy another (having a radio telescope array). But the market provides a good means to balance between these preferences; the SETI geek might to demonstrate through revealed preference on many levels that a radio telescope array really is critical to her core desires. This can happen through market pricing of the resources she uses, but also through the effective “pricing” being transmitted through her relationships with others. And if her project’s concentration of resources would leave others destitute or barred from achieving their own core desires they may simply fail to respect her claim/title to it.

There are of course good game-theoretic reasons to gravitate towards categorical-imperative equilibria where disrespecting someones’ claim is no casual affair, and I would certainly encourage more thought into dynamic and responsive strategies and what schelling points we might find in dealing with this. But nevertheless we should reflect more on the subjectivity of theft itself and remember that society is ultimately made up of individuals with relations, not organizations and rules, and blinding ourselves to those root realities impedes our agency, just like any other self-deception.

Yes, it must be admitted frankly and openly that naive or simple reputation dynamics alone are dangerous. Social capitalism can be at least as vicious as any other system. One of the primary critiques left market anarchists have increasingly leveled against communistic anarchists is that their prescriptions risk chaining us in the sociopathic quagmire so often seen in social anarchist scenes whereby power structures are just shifted entirely to the realm of popularity contests and team sports. Where almost every action is reduced to social positioning and triangulation.

The abstractions of property and markets provide some defense against this nightmare — the freedom to engage in relatively impersonal interactions can be incredibly important and necessary, as David Graeber has argued in The Utopia of Rules. He used this to justify bureaucratic systems like consensus meetings. But here questions of centralization crop up. Systems that appeal harder to organizationalism and collective decisionmaking than autonomous action inherently create effective concentrations of social power, capable of being seized and leveraged.

Decentralization, when paired with sufficient technological freedom/complexity that conflict becomes asymmetric to the benefit of minorities, provides additional security and resilience against power structures. And a general tendency within a mature and enlightened reputation market to move towards property titles would provide security against the horrors of raw social capitalism. One hopes a balance point can be reached organically, like a price, between the dangers of naive and immediate reputation games and the dangers of an overly rigid property system. Reputation is the soil in which we must cultivate a rich and highly-evolved ecology of social relations.

But in some sense it doesn’t matter whether or not you’d like property titles to ultimately be emergent from reputation. They empirically are. There’s a reason credit preceded currency — as Graeber had to remind a number of economists — trust and goodwill are simply the foundation of the world we move in. We can try to blind ourselves to this or we can take the more anarchistic route of informed agency, refusing to fetishize or enslave ourselves to structures and conventions.

And here’s where the divide between the hardest of Lockean Rothbardians and the more communistic georgists or mutualists starts to buckle:

If trying to problematize our injunctions against or even defend outright theft is a terrifying step to some, the flipside to viewing property titles as emergent from reputation is that it provides us with greater security against the possible downsides of numerous market mechanisms. And thus it gives us greater security and latitude in adopting them.

Land ownership, capital ownership, rent, interest, all of these can serve useful functions in transmitting important market information, in facilitating our broader collaboration by supplying additional information and nuance to the market. While all of these dynamics can grow cancerous, it would be insane to try and suppress pricing for risk, for example. The efficient allocation of resources to satiate everyone requires means to integrate predictions of future developments.

The market and the assignment of property titles within it is a garden we grow. A tool. Just like consensus process or breaking out into working groups. Like any means of organization we should not fetishize it. It is an extraordinarily useful and necessary tool, but just like any procedure we might adopt it is not a god. And its precise happenstance structure is surely not foundational to our ethics.

We must retain our critical faculties and agency, our capacity to both immediately and smoothly respond the moment our tool stops working. If some post-revolution market does in fact develop cancers of severe capital or wealth accumulation that runaway faster than the myriad diseconomies of scale and centrifugal forces within freed markets can suppress… then we can always just stop respecting some of the property titles of those in danger of becoming new rulers.

Similarly there are plenty of contexts in which the problems markets and property titles are supremely useful at resolving are not the most pressing ones. Three shipwrecked people aren’t going to divide up their island, write elaborate contracts, and start a fish subprime derivatives stand. Not unless they’re sociopaths. In simple subsistence conditions with small communities it makes far more sense to never even think about titles, but discuss the uses of everything collectively. You can put a reasonable bound on the community discussions necessary to coordinate the growing of potatoes.

Context matters, and what as anarchists we should be doing is encouraging people to think for themselves, to understand and appreciate the dynamics at play. That property and markets can be and are useful, but for underlying reasons dependent upon a host of things.

Sadly when we talk about property norms being determined by the community this very quickly tends to assume a single coherent community rather than a very complicated mesh of individuals, and our talk of “norms” likewise seems to assume the form of edicts, rather than a more dynamic and shifting reality like prices. Set rules versus constantly and organically mediated agreements.

The foundation of property shouldn’t hinge on what rocks you’ve poked some point in the past or even what you’ve chosen to extend your cybernetic nervous system into, but what best satiates your desires or aspirations in balance with everyone else’s. This is after all what markets at their best promise: The notion that everyone’s subjective preferences will be satiated more efficiently than would be possible attempting to talk them out in a global consensus meeting.

If markets have a hard time resolving something then they shouldn’t complain if the answer turns out to be to extend the dynamics of markets deeper, to make the very foundations of the economic sphere more organic. And oh, whoops, now no one condemns me for driving off with one of Bill Gates’s cars.

There are two sets of ultimate justifications for property and markets. One is rooted in an entitled tit-for-tat demand for 1-on-1 “fairness.” The other is grounded in a wider ethical lens, seeking only the betterment of all. It should be no surprise if the market structures ultimately promoted by either differ. We’ve already seen that this is the case with “intellectual property.” Libertarians and even state socialists have split hard internally on this issue, some demanding “but I put energy into this, I am due recompense, that’s what fairness is” while others aghast that anyone would even think of seeking to exclude or control what others can have when scarcity is no longer relevant. This poorly papered over chasm between selfish and selfless core perspectives deserves widening. I know what side I’m on.

January 16 2016


Czech translation of our most popular article, "The Promise of a Post-Copyright World".

IdeasBy far the most popular article on this site (over half a million views now and counting) is The Surprising History of Copyright and the Promise of a Post-Copyright World.  Courtesy of Antonín Houska, it is now available in Czech (česky): Překvapivá historie copyrightu a příslib světa po něm.

Thank you, Antonín!

It's also been translated into Chinese, Polish, Latvian, and Italian.  We're very grateful to all the translators; it's a lot of work for a piece of that length.  But the existence of these translations should also serve as a reminder of the vast amount of material in the world that would be translated if it weren't restricted by copyright monopolies -- a topic we've covered in depth before.

Happy New Year, everyone.  Let's try to have more freedom in 2016 than we did in 2015.



December 23 2015



Video of Freedombox Demo v0.6 posted

December 23, 2015

You can find video of Sunil's demo of the 0.6 release of the FreedomBox software at the Software Freedom Law Center's video archive.

We have released a newer version of FreedomBox since then that primarily focused on internationalization. If you are interested in downloading the newest versi on you can find the official images here.

December 20 2015



FreedomBox 0.7 Released!

December 19, 2015

I'm pleased to announce that FreedomBox 0.7 has been released! This release comes 7 weeks after the previous release (0.6).

FreedomBox version 0.7 is available here:

Before using, you should verify the image's signature. See for further instructions.

Thanks to all who helped to put this release together.

More information on this release is available on the wiki:

Major FreedomBox 0.7 Changes:

  • Translations! Full translations of the interface in Danish, Dutch, French, German and Norwegian Bokmål, and partial Telugu.
  • Support for OLinuXino A20 MICRO and LIME2
  • New Plinth applications: OpenVPN, reStore (currently disabled in Plinth config, until Debian package is uploaded)
  • Improved first-boot experience
  • Many bugfixes and cleanups

Known Bugs:

  • When Transmission page is accessed after install, it will show "403: Forbidden". Here is a workaround for this issue:

  • Log into your FreedomBox using the console or SSH.

  • Edit the Transmission configuration: $ sudo vi /etc/transmission-daemon/settings.json Change "rpc-whitelist-enabled" to false. Save and quit.

  • Reload the Transmission server. $ sudo invoke-rc.d transmission-daemon reload Important: Make sure you reload instead of restart* the service. Otherwise your changes to the configuration will get overwritten.

  • Access the Transmission page at https://freedombox.local/transmission or similar.

Please feel free to join us to discuss this release on the mailing list, IRC, or on the monthly progress calls:

December 02 2015


How the O Lordy Curve Got Its Name

Driving through the Boston Mountains for Thanksgiving dinner, I decided to relate an old family story about that route while there's still someone alive to remember it.

The seventeen miles from Winslow to Mountainburg is very crooked and steep, and my family calls the sharpest curve the O Lordy Curve.

It got its name back in the '50s when my Aunt Alma and Uncle Ivan went down to Ft. Chaffee to bring my Uncle Dale up to Springdale on leave from the Army. The road was narrower and more dangerous back then, and Uncle Ivan drove pretty fast and recklessly. Alma was a large bosomy woman, and Ivan was a lanky man with bony elbows. Dale sat in the middle, and kept getting tossed back and forth against Alma and Ivan as the latter whipped around the curves.

Every time Ivan sped around a bad curve, Alma would moan "O Lordy, Ivan, you're going to kill us all!" And when they went around the sharpest S-curve on the route, Alma started hollering "O Lordy O Lordy O Lordy O Lordy!"

That's how the O Lordy Curve got its name.

Addendum. The 17-mile Boston Mountain route is anchored on its south end by Mountainburg Hill,  a steep, winding pathway about two miles long just outside Mountainburg. It can overhead an old car engine even today. In my grandfather's time, the old men used to sit in the cafe and compare their time getting up Mountainburg Hill with a wagon and team of mules.

November 23 2015


Copyright Is Brain Damage, Freedom of Speech Begins at Home: Nina Paley Speaks at TEDxMaastricht.

This 18-minute talk is by far the best explanation I've seen yet of why you should question copyright.

In the last few years, I've watched QCO Artist-in-Residence Nina Paley refine her message about the harm of copyright and permission culture. Now it's the most direct and most effective it's ever been. If you want just one video to show people to explain to them what this movement is about, let this be the one. Nina tells an appreciative audience why she had to set her mind free in order to make art, and shows some wonderful clips from her next film Seder-Masochism — a film that simply couldn't be made within the permission culture that Nina diagnoses so eloquently:



November 02 2015



Freedombox 0.6 Released!

October 31, 2015


I'm pleased to announce that FreedomBox version 0.6 has been released! This release comes 2 months after the previous, 0.5 release.

Please feel free to join us to discuss this release on the mailing list, IRC, or on the monthly progress calls:

The FreedomBox version 0.6 is available here:

Before using, you should verify the image's signature, see for further instructions:

$ gpg --keyserver hkp:// --recv-keys 0x36C361440C9BC971

$ gpg --fingerprint 0x36C361440C9BC971

pub   4096R/0C9BC971 2011-11-12
      Key fingerprint = BCBE BD57 A11F 70B2 3782
                        BC57 36C3 6144 0C9B C971
uid                  Sunil Mohan Adapa <>
sub   4096R/4C1D4B57 2011-11-12

$ gpg --verify freedombox-unstable_2015-10-18_raspberry-armel-card.tar.bz2.sig freedombox-unstable_2015-10-18_raspberry-armel-card.tar.bz2

(Replace the file names with the version you download.)

Thanks to all who helped put this release together.

More information on this release is available on the wiki:

Major FreedomBox 0.6 Changes:

  • New supported hardware target: Raspberry Pi 2
  • New modules in Plinth:
    • Shaarli: Web application to manage and share bookmarks.
    • Date & Time: Configure time zone and NTP service.
    • Service Discovery: Configure Avahi service.
    • Debian packages can be download over Tor.
  • Switched from mod_ssl to mod_gnutls.
  • Documentation Revamp:
    • Get latest FreedomBox user manual from wiki.
    • Manual is focused on using FreedomBox, with a section on developing Plinth modules.
  • Wi-Fi configuration now in general network configuration.

Known Bugs:

  • DreamPlugs do not boot the 0.6 image. Please upgrade your previous Dreamplug by manually upgrading Plinth to 0.6.


November 01 2015


Putting Deep Perceptual Learning in OpenCog

This post presents some speculative ideas and plans, but I broadcast them here because I think they are of particular strategic importance for the OpenCog project….
The topic is: how OpenCog and “current-variety deep learning perception algorithms” can help each other.
Background: Modern Deep Learning Networks

“Deep learning” architectures have worked wonders on visual and auditory data in recent years, and have also shown limited interesting results on other sorts of data such as natural language.   The impressive applications have all involved training deep learning nets using a supervised learning methodology, on large training corpora; and the particulars of the network tend to be specifically customized to the problem at hand.   There is also work on unsupervised learning, though so far purely unsupervised learning has not yielded practically impressive results.  There is not much new conceptually in the new deep learning work, and nothing big that’s new mathematically; it’s mostly the availability of massive computing power and training data that has led to the recent, exciting successes…
These deep learning methods are founded on broad conceptual principles, such as
  • intelligence consists largely of hierarchical pattern recognition — recognition of patterns within patterns within patterns.. —
  • a mind should use both bottom-up and top-down dynamics to recognize patterns in a given data-item based on its own properties and based on experience from looking at other items
  • in many cases, the dimensional structure of spacetime can be used to guide hierarchical pattern recognition (so that patterns higher-up in the hierarchy pertain to larger regions of spacetime)
However, the tools normally labeled “deep learning” these days constitute a very, very particular way of embodying these general principles, using certain sorts of “formal neural nets” and related structures.  There are many other ways to manifest the general principles of “hierarchical pattern recognition via top-down and bottom-up learning, guided by spatiotemporal structure.”
The strongest advocates of the current deep learning methods claim that the deep networks currently used for perception, can be taken as templates or at least close inspirations for creating deep networks to be used for everything else a human-level intelligence needs to do.  The use of human-labeled training examples obviously doesn’t constitute a general-intelligence-capable methodology, but if one substitutes a reinforcement signal for a human label, then one has an in-principle workable methodology.
Weaker advocates claim that networks such as these may serve as a large part of a general intelligence architecture, but may ultimately need to be augmented by other components with (at least somewhat) different structures and dynamics.
It is sometimes suggested that the “right” deep learning network might serve the role of the “one crucial learning algorithm” underlying human and human-like general intelligence.   However, the deep learning paradigm does not rely on this idea… it might also be that a human-level intelligence requires a significant number of differently-configured deep networks, connected together in an appropriate architecture.
Deep Learning + OpenCog

My own intuition is that, given the realities of current (or near future) computer hardware technology, deep learning networks are a great way to handle visual and auditory perception and some other sorts of data processing; but that for many other critical parts of human-like cognition, deep learning is best suited for a peripheral role (or no role at all).   Based on this idea, Ted Sanders, Jade O’Neill and I did some prototype experiments a few years ago, connecting a deep learning vision system (DeSTIN) with OpenCog via extracting patterns from DeSTIN states over time and importing relations among these patterns into the OpenCog Atomspace.   This prototype work served to illustrate a principle, but did not represent a scalable methodology (the example dataset used was very small, and the different components of the architecture were piped together using ad hoc specialized scripts).
I’ve now started thinking seriously about how to resume this direction of work, but “doing it for real” this time.   What I’d like to do is build a deep learning architecture inside OpenCog, initially oriented toward vision and audition, with a goal of making it relatively straightforward to interface between deep learning perception networks and OpenCog’s cognitive mechanisms.
What cognitive mechanisms am I thinking of?
  1. The OpenCog Pattern Miner, written by Shujing Ke (in close collaboration with me on the conceptual and math aspects), can be used to recognize (frequent or surprising) patterns among states of a deep learning network — if this network’s states are represented as Atoms.   Spatiotemporal patterns among these “generally common or surprising” patterns may then be recognized and stored in the Atomspace as well. Inference may be done, using PLN, on the links representing these spatiotemporal patterns.  Clusters of spatiotemporal patterns may be formed, and inference may be done regarding these clusters.
  2. Having recognized common patterns within a set of states of a deep network, one can then annotate new deep-network states with the “generally common patterns” that they contain.   One may then use the links known in the Atomspace regarding these patterns, to create new *features* associated with nodes in the deep-network.  These features may be used as inputs for the processing occurring within the deep network.
This would be a quite thorough and profound form of interaction between perceptual and cognitive algorithms.
This sort of interaction could be done without implementing deep learning networks in the Atomspace, but it will be much easier operationally if they are represented in the Atomspace.
A Specific Proposal
So I’ve put together a specific proposal for putting deep learning into OpenCog, for computer vision (at first) and audition.   In its initial version, this would let one build quite flexible deep learning networks in OpenCog, deferring the expensive number-crunching operations to the GPU via the Theano library developed by Yoshua Bengio’s group at U. Montreal.
As it may get tweaked and improved or augmented by others, I’ve put it at the OpenCog wiki site instead of packing it into this blog post… you can read it at

flattr this!


Pattern Miner!

Check it out — thanks to Shujing Ke, we now have a “frequent and surprising pattern miner” for OpenCog, which runs either on a single machine or distributed across multiple machines!

This is a “greedy algorithm” for exhaustively finding patterns in an Atomspace.  In the big picture, it’s intended to complement smarter but even-slower non-greedy algorithms.

This obsoletes “Fishgram” which was the previous attempt at OpenCog pattern mining, but was much less scalable and (unlike the current pattern miner) did not use the Atomspace for its internal, incremental pattern-store.

A tutorial with examples is here:

and the code is here

We had to make up some new math for measuring  surprisingness

(though the stuff about “coherence” is not in the current code).  In practice these new measures seem to work better than using the (closely related, but different) interaction information…

In order to make performance even  moderately acceptable, it’s necessary to add a bunch of “filters” to rule out patterns that seem very unlikely to be interesting.   To use this as a narrow-AI pattern miner for specific domains, one will probably need to create domain-specific filters.  In the current code version this is done in the C++ code.  An interesting potential future improvement would be to make the filters be Atoms, and let the filtering be done using the URE OpenCog rule engine.   I suppose this would be needed for pattern mining in a real AGI context….

Anyway this is an exciting and major addition to the arsenal of OpenCog tools and I hope others will now take the opportunity to improve it and apply it!   Many thanks are due to Shujing; this was a lot of work over a long period of time….

Currently the documentation consists of code docs plus the Wiki page linked above.  Scientific publications describing the underlying theory and some particular applications will be forthcoming “soon”….

October 19 2015



FreedomBox Halloween Hack-a-thon

Saturday October 31st, 2015

The FreedomBox Foundation is hosting a Halloween hack-a-thon on Saturday October 31st at the offices of the Software Freedom Law Center from 10 am to 6 pm, near Lincoln Center in New York City. New and existing contributors will be getting together to work on our Debian-based privacy-respecting self-hosting software suite and wireless router.

Members of the FreedomBox core development team will be on hand to help new contributors get involved and to get some actual work done! We are going to be talking about:

  • how to use a FreedomBox as a secure home router;
  • using existing Debian packages to integrate them into FreedomBoxes;
  • integrating in a secure decentralized social network;
  • replacing passwords with an integrated authentication system based on PGP;

We live in a world where our use of the network is mediated by organizations that often do not have our best interests at heart. To regain control of our privacy, the FreedomBox project is building an integrated suite of software that does not rely on centralized services. Of course much of this software already exists. We are hacking, tweaking, and molding it into a easy to use software suite so everyone can regain control of their privacy by running a FreedomBox at home.

Bring yourselves, your ideas, your PGP keys, and your Raspberry Pis (or other device you want to try FreedomBox on!) We will bring the pizza, over-caffeinated soda, and Halloween candy.

Time: 10:00 am to 6:00 pm, October 31st, 2015 Location: Software Freedom Law Center, 1995 Broadway, 17th Floor, New York, NY

Email us at hackathon at to let us know you are coming so we can be sure to order enough food and caffeine email.


Sunil Presentation

FreedomBox 0.6 Presentation

October 19, 2015

Sunil is doing a presentation at the Software Freedom Law Center's annual conference on October 30th. He will be showing off the forth coming 0.6 release. (Look for the 0.6 release any day now)

The Conference is at the Columbia Law School on Friday October 30th. Sunil's presentation will start at around 2:45 pm. The Conference is free. You can find out more information about it at the Software Freedom Law Center's website

October 10 2015


A Quick And Dirty Critique Of Primitivist & AntiCiv Thought

This text is available in ebook format and as a zine formatted for printing.

When I was six-years-old my anarchist dad smuggled me a copy of Jurassic Park against my mom’s prohibitions. “When you can read it, you can read it,” he said, and within a year I had not only learned every last word, I’d read my fraying copy cover to cover dozens of times in the boring waits at homeless shelters, soup kitchens and welfare offices. Surrounded by a filthy concrete dystopia I read again and again with wide eyes as the Cassandra character inveighed against rigid systems of control as prone to diminishing returns and inevitable catastrophe, spoke about how hunter gatherers worked far less and played far more. I was hooked. Between survivalist day camps and Zerzan tracts at the used bookstore primitivism gave me wonderful ammunition against the myriad tyrannies that littered my existence, from elementary school to the hustles of poverty. These too shall fall, I contented myself. I played in the tiny forest behind the projects we came to live in and loathed the corruption that crept in. I pulled up concrete and broke car windows with my friends.

But mostly I continued to read.

And gradually, slowly, I started to recognize other dynamics at play, other possibilities, and more solid or rooted critiques of power. The claims of John and company started to sour. I realized they were less and less substantiated, clear-cut or sweeping. And, as the points I still agreed with were made in ever more disingenuous or opportunistic rhetoric, I felt betrayed. I began consciously parting ways with primitivism while fighting in the streets of Seattle in ’99. I’d grown too audacious to settle for the limited values, blueprints & strategies of primitivism, and it was clear there was no going back.

The same insatiable love for the natural universe that prompted me to fall in love with the forests of Cascadia ended up taking me to theoretical physics. And when I look back at primitivism what I see now seems ever more cold and unrecognizable. Bros chortling about and encouraging the death of billions. Open anti-intellectualism and unbelievably shoddy arguments. Awkward ethical frameworks as well as misunderstandings of anthropological and archaeological records. There are exceptions to be sure — the occasional intellectually vigilant, analytic and sincere individual burnt out and hedging her bets. But Primitivism as a whole? I don’t see the arrival of authoritarian psuedo-Maoist cults, John retreating to openly embrace “spiritualism”, and murderous idiots who think lobbing the term “modernism” is a meaningful argument, are disconnected from the underlying rot.

I wrote on this subject a decade ago, but my approaches were directed at the theoretical formulations of primitivism I found most substantive at the time. For whatever reason — and perhaps for the worse — those currents have since mostly died out. Today the landscape is even more ideologically fractured and many have retreated to a nebulous “anti-civ” position that inherits most of the primitivist framework while remaining loose enough to duck most criticism. But while those identify as anti-civ may individually break with some aspects of primitivism, without any of the frameworks or narratives of primitivism, there wouldn’t be an anti-civ position to speak.

Core to the term “anti-civ” itself is a sweeping impression of “civilization” that is intensely problematic and lends itself to overly simplistic narratives. Primitivism is rife with this kind of irreductionist handwaving that dreams up big monsters from loose associations and gives them agency as magical forces acting on the macroscale, shaping every particular. Following an approach that Ellul openly termed “monism”, primitivism refuses to pick these spooks apart, to recognize any conflict between or latitude in the configuration of their constituent dynamics. Everything is seen as inextricably woven into a whole that acts according to a simple narrative. Such a conspiratorial mode of thought is basically just a doubling down on Marxism, replacing “capitalism” with even broader and more abstract monsters of “technology” and “civilization”. These tales are often explicitly anti-radical in their disdain for getting at the root components.

This reactionary tendency prompts the leveling of normative appeals in terms of broad macroscopic impressions or intuition pumps rather than concretely rooted ethical arguments. Primitivism isn’t an analysis so much as a story. And to function it thus requires a pruning away of complications, never searching beyond the frame or terms of the macroscopic narrative. It happily collects piles of supporting factoids, claims, and even concrete points. But since what matters most are the broad impressions, any specific critique one might level against a given claim is easily sidestepped by just switching to new claims. Tackling primitivism effectively first requires stepping up to the level of generality it operates in — critiquing classes, categories, or trends of arguments within primitivist discourse so as to leave no ground to retreat to, to box in any specific argument from all sides. Only then can we get down into the weeds about the possibilities and dynamics of endless particulars like coltan mining.


The mainstream definition of technology is basically “ways of doing stuff.” And so it’s inclusive of language, knowledge, equations, tactics, heuristics, tools, and even our bodies. Any conceivable means or avenue by which one might act or accomplish something.

Yet in common use “technology” has come to accumulate stronger associations with a subset of these means — ipods and bulldozers rather than ballet exercises or vocal chords. This “technology” is a weird bundle of things, more an aesthetic of physical objects than anything substantive. Is it grey? Does it have metal in it? Corners?

There are a lot of new means that have been developed since industrialization, but average people don’t tend to refer to whiteboards or yoga as “technologies”. Instead there is a very distinct narrative of progress that is widely sold to us by our rulers and it places shit like laptops and cars as the pinnacle of all technologies — to the point where every other means of doing things is implicitly derided. Similarly although “machine” can mean virtually anything with noticeable sub-dynamics that uses energy to do things, we don’t tend to refer to mallard ducks or squirt guns as “machines.” There’s an implicit teleology baked into the way we use these terms.

Primitivists frequently take this looser impression or narrative as their starting point rather than the broader if more concrete definition. And they’ve sought different definitions of technology alongside different analyses to try and better explain these associations. But I am not sure that there’s ultimately any real coherence or substance to the popular bias in our use. There is a sense that we “know technology when we see it” and yet this really does seem to appeal to nothing more than an aesthetic strand with a rather random lineage. The popular impression is arbitrary in various ways that are becoming increasingly inescapable and it does seem like we have no choice but to chuck that impression for the more precise and rooted — if broader — definition of means (something it’s impossible to sweepingly reject without rejecting all freedom to act).

While specific thinkers have built specific edifices of claims, in general they tend to take two distinct approaches in forging alternate definitions of “technology” that are narrower than “tools” or “means.” These two loci of alternative definitions are still quite influential to anti-civ thought, and examining them is highly illustrative.


The first of these approaches to defining “technology” is to appeal to the popular intuition in our era of a dichotomy between living things and non-living.

Some things are “alive”, other things are not. It’s a common rule of thumb and biologists at least for a while tried hard to make it a precise taxonomy. But the category of “living” is a notoriously problematic and probably meaningless intuition (are viruses alive? prions? how about stars? why shouldn’t we interpret crystals and rocks as living? where should boundaries be drawn between organisms? between them and their environment?).

On the other hand, unlike “alive”, there’s hope that our impression of “organic” can actually be saved. We can sometimes make a substantive distinction that holds between suppleness or fluidity and rigidity or brittleness. And certainly crassly-developed structures like highways and cars are insanely rigid and brittle. We’ve always had more organic technologies, but it’s certainly true that there’s been noteworthy pressures towards overly rigid technologies, particularly in the industrial era. Most of what is conjured by the term “industrial civilization” are huge infrastructural projects and operations with little to no adaptability. Modern capitalism depends on a lack of dynamic price signals and redistribution; large towering economic and political institutions rely on rigidity, the perpetual maintenance of certain conditions, so they don’t have to calculate and adjust to changing conditions whether ecological or human. And incredible sums of violence and human energy have been expended to maintain certain arbitrary conditions — demand, profit, etc. The rigidity of large infrastructural projects like the highway system, the diverse subsidies of fossil fuels, etc, underpin this social landscape. Rigidity is certainly characteristic of any system conducive to power relations, and the more rigid the more potentially brittle.

It’s easy to tie this to the simple and rock-like gears and mortar of early industrial factories. When we call something “cold and mechanical” the gist of what we’re saying is typically that it’s rigid and overly simple in structure rather that richly complex, engaged and adaptive.

Yet the overwhelming inclination today — even if it may be too late — is to make our tools more fluidly reconfigurable. General purpose computing has always been at root an attempt to escape the rigidities of single-configuration mechanisms. And now the great drive is to make the hardware of computers and other tools more fluid both in function and composition. So that we might construct or tear apart and rebuild them on the fly in our garage or local hackerspace in more decentralized and DIY ways.

Similarly the primitivist impulse to oppose biotechnology doesn’t ultimately square with a definition of technology as rigidity. While humans have always used biotech from cultivating plants long before agriculture to grafting trees, recent developments have given us a great deal more understanding and lattitude in how to reconfigure biological systems, including things like anarchist biohackers getting yeast to produce critical cheese proteins without enslaving cows. While some multinational corporations may surely encourage their engineers and technologists to approach biotech from a rigid perspective — clumsily stitching in random genes with as little knowledge or appreciation for much context beyond immediate trial and error — many clearly do not.

There’s a deep problem here: More degrees of freedom in manipulation and reconfiguration — in action — is the definition of organic fluidity, and so in a very non-trivial sense our drive to better understand things and to have more means of doing things is ultimately a pressure towards more organic tools. Technological development — in the sense of inventions that expand our array of tools to choose from — can clearly be aligned in a positive direction. Indeed, when older or simpler technologies aren’t stomped out by power structures and newer technologies aren’t censored or filtered, any new invention adds to the array of possible means we have, and thus inherently expands the fluidity of our options.

Following this argument sincerely the conclusion would be that we need wider and more diverse ecosystems of tools, not less. Indeed one quickly comes to realize that the sin of the rigidities of our infrastructure and social systems are the way they suppress technological flourishing.


However the second major primitivist approach to defining “technology” is on its face almost the exact opposite of the organic/inorganic dichotomy: In this lens what’s focused on as the problem is the complexity of various tools and the infrastructures or social context they’re embedded within.

An aside: I’m old enough to remember when the primary green anarchist critique of our technology was that it was too simple or boring and demanded too much rigid focus (that era saw all kinds of fucked up slogans like “only the machines don’t have ADHD” or “civilization is making us autistic” that would never fly today). In the last decade of course the script has almost entirely flipped; now ‘technology’ is more frequently attacked as being inherently too engaging, too complex, and too unfocused. Instead of zoning out forever in front of the “boob-tube” we’re now flitting back and forth between wikipedia and text messages on our phones. Certainly both attitudes represent a meaningful pushback against real tendencies in the tools and norms of their eras, but the leap to define technology “inherently” in such terms is a bit frustrating.

Nevertheless there is some substance to critiques of the complexity of the systems we use. Human brains are astonishingly complex and very plastic, but there are architectural limits to what we can process or keep in conscious attention, not to mention how quickly. We’ve all experienced bad, overly cluttered user interfaces on an app or even bad pedagogical presentations of a topic that require a ton of rewiring in our brains to process. Sometimes this can be like mental stretching — and it can be in different contexts a matter of healthy exercise, or just neutral or marginal. But sometimes to really understand or diligently engage with a system is beyond our present cognitive capacity — and sometimes it’s even beyond beyond any feasible supercomputer. The cryptographic tools that have seen such dizzying success in fighting the NSA are only possible because of inescapable computational limits baked in to our universe by mathematics and physics. Create a sufficiently complex system and it will be beyond the capacity of any central authority or supercomputer to fully know much less control. In so many respects this is true of our present society.

A common refrain in anti-civ discourse is that large scale societies are unnatural and unworkable because we just can’t know everyone the same way we could in small tribes. The relationships and interpersonal drama at play in a tribe of a hundred or so people may be complex, but when scaled up to thousands or millions or billions our puny brains can’t even begin to make heads or tails of everything. And so, the story goes, we move through our lives disconnected and mentally frayed by the incalculable complexity of the society around us. Now it’s certainly true that we can sometimes feel overwhelmed by the staggering diversity of life and feedbacking cultural complexity unleashed by large societies, but there’s an important difference to be highlighted between the invigorating complexity in a new genre of queer hip hop, versus the staggering complexity of a bureaucratic forms in a system denying us food stamps. Power and choice matters. When our lives are forcibly put on the line or when we’re trying to make a difference but have no idea where to start, an overwhelming complex system can be alienating and terrifying, especially when violence is artificially simplifying away our option to not engage. Yet without that pressure complexity becomes delightful and invigorating. Human beings have always held an attraction to complexity. Indeed much of the cross-cultural tendencies we consistently display in response to different visual media has to do with what complex dynamics we are able to discern in them — what organic interplay our brains discern in a forest versus a featureless rocky landscape. Occasionally this childlike hunger for complexity is beaten out of us and we adopt a staid sedentary undeath presented as “adulthood” or “maturity”. But time and time again we’ve strived for greater connection and community beyond the size of mere tribes. Even in places where the land would not permanently sustain it hunter-gatherers would voluntarily come together in the thousands for weeks or months on end, desperately striving to enjoy the benefits of mass society.

A frequently associated notion is that without deep personal knowledge of a person or ties to them we have no reason to care about them. This nihilistic take on ethics is most prominently championed by the terrorist group Individuals Tending Towards Savagery who’ve tried to murder students and anarchists in Mexico City; they explicitly reject and deride feeling compassion for people beyond one’s immediate tribe. The obvious response, that empathy is generalizable and that we can in some very real sense feel compassion for the stranger who stumbles directly in front of us is, I think, rather trivially true and obvious to anyone who isn’t a sociopath. Just as a toddler eventually comes to realize that other people exist, so too are we capable of growing better heuristics and growing more coherent in our intentions, developing not just the capacity to appreciate the existence of people we know through news reports rather than eyesight but to weigh and analyze our impact upon them. Similarly we have gotten extraordinarily good at quickly acclimating to strangers as well as situating them. Happenstance of birth location, language, family, etc are not — and shouldn’t be — a determinant for affinity. It certainly doesn’t reflect what relationships are most fecund for liberatory collaboration and development.

The complexity of our physical tools follows a similar arc. Complexity can be invigorating and it can be terrorizing — what matters are the power dynamics those complexities are embedded within. And there can be healthy ways of managing or navigating our interactions with incredibly complex systems without retreating from all interaction or attempting to artificially flatten them away. Indeed one of the major priorities of power has been to suppress complexity, to limit or prune down the ecology of possible tools to just a few options and impose them universally. To hide away the internals of our tools and external context behind a facade. It should be telling that those realms anarchists have gravitated towards or have pioneered — like open source — have been distinguished by their embrace of complexity. Of course it’s important to retain agency, to be able to select the tools of the appropriate complexity one needs or feels equipped to handle. Where we choose to invest our attention and thus cognitive or symbolic complexity is an important choice and many political or ethical arguments boil down to equally valid personal preferences, preferred realms of tinkering and play. But the complexity imbued within a tool — whether mesh wifi algorithms or prose or a hand-hewn bow — is in no remote sense innately negative.

It’s important to note that the operative word really is “imbued.” While it can be possible to talk of complexity in concrete computational terms like Kolmogorov’s formulation, ‘complexity’ can also matter in intensely subjective and relative terms that don’t necessarily bear a direct relation to fundamental physical limits. Human beings assign symbolic or cognitive complexity in frequently haphazard, situational or anthropocentric ways. We think of our bodies as being “more complex” than coral reefs or gusts of wind, but it’s not remotely clear that there’s any greater computational complexity going on in the molecular dynamics that make us up. There’s a danger of being closer to the subject and thus assigning more attention and conceptual signifiers to it.

Similarly our problem has often been not assigning enough complexity to our interactions with the world. Agriculture is filled with examples of humans constructing insufficiently complex or nuanced approaches. Even horticulture and hunting or foraging almost always involve drastically simplifying the ecological patterns to some structure or framework that’s easy to deal with or model. We’ve often sought to reduce the complexity of the dynamics surrounding us to better keep track of and utilize them and sometimes this ends up being a really bad idea.

If anything the problem has long been that we’ve built tools that aren’t complex enough to handle the complex environments or particulars they contend with.

“Complexity” is often bandied about like a single magical diagnostic for the collapse of historical civilizations, but again the problem becomes what “complexities” we see and name. Cultures can grow complex in insular ways, creating disconnected interpretive nets or languages that barely refer to anything. Additionally, power structures can attempt to awkwardly weld nuances and internal accounting methods into themselves in a desperate attempt to make up for their inadequacies without actually dissolving the core rigidities or imposed simplicities that gird and support their existence. All of that is real, yet the end of the day empires fall because they’re not able to countenance or support the internal complexity necessary for more fluid engagement and adaptation. Indeed past a certain point of complexity empires would cease to be empires, dissolving away into more complex/organic modes.

Our technologies can develop in the direction of insularity — overextending themselves in twists of disconnected and unnecessary complexity — and at the same time they can also overextend themselves in overly simple ways that aren’t responsive to the complex particulars of their environment and users. But additionally they can also integrate fluidly with these considerations. Although power itself often acts to artificially simplify for managerial purposes or to violently sever connections in ways that lead to cancerous insularity, this pressure is distinct and in no way inherent to technology itself. Tools are often embedded in a wider context, but they can also be distinct from that context. A hammer can be made many ways and can function even when the original hammer factory shutters. Many of the things primitivists love to take as ‘fundamental’ to the production of certain technologies are anything but.

Yes, infrastructural realities are incredibly important. The creation of the highway system, for example, has famously driven the normalization of the car form and a huge array of attendant tendencies. The sweeping violence of the state allows it to build artificial mass and scope and thus to impose forms or structures without much regard for their desirability or optimality. Solar steam engines were ready and highly viable two hundred years ago, but were abruptly sidelined permanently when the British Empire happened to conquer a large coal deposit along with a slave populace to mine it. Infrastructural forms feedback in a wide variety of ways with psychology, social norms, and power structures. This much is absolutely true. The community that builds a decentralized network of DIY radio towers stretching between villages to spread word about rapists or attempted marauders is going to have a resultant pressure towards a certain social configuration. Similarly the society that forces people off land to lower the price of oil will be able to use cheaper transportation to facilitate economies of scale, as well as imperial breadth and to suppress the diffusion of alternative technologies by lowering costs.

But it’s vital that we distinguish between applied infrastructure and individual technologies. And between technologies in the standard sense of means or knowledge of how to and actual commodity products. These are distinctions primitivism gleefully wants to handwave away as all inseparable parts of a singular “megamachine”, and blurred together they do make a simpler narrative, but distinguishing them can reveal a lot of critical points and tensions.

There is absolutely no doubt that the vast majority of things that characterize the global infrastructure at present are rotten and must be changed. But we must be diligent in our analysis of it, not merely appeal to the quickest way to present or phrase our resistance.

And the fact of the matter is the increasing complexity of our technology can be incredibly liberatory. Freedom doesn’t lie in simplifying the world around us so that we never have to change ourselves to engage with it. So what if we don’t understand the exact structure and function of every device we use? We typically don’t understand the biochemical structures and functions of the plants we eat. It’s certainly good to be able to understand such dynamics, but all human interaction with the world will inherently involve some pragmatic conceptual abstraction away from underlying complexities. A liberated world would surely be a richly lush and diverse world filled with endless complexities to explore, but not everyone will explore the same things.

The social and technological complexities before us might be new and as yet unsettled into some sort of long-term dynamic equilibrium, but such equilibria are few and far between; the earth’s biosphere itself is always changing. The world described by 18th century biologists looking for a clockwork universe unchanged since set in motion by its creator is a lie — an attempt to make the constant churning of reality more palatable to a staid ruling class, self-domesticated within many walls of imposed simplicity. This kind of violent simplification of the physical world and of human desires and thoughts is necessary for power to act, to even exist. If it is to be taken down we must do more than wait for nature to erode it away, we must embrace the creative fountainheads of engaged fluid complexity within ourselves.

There remains great richness and complexity beyond the harsh walls of suburbia in the flows of our biosphere, and it has significant value, but far greater wildness lies ahead of us should we have the guts to embrace it. To plunge headlong into uncharted waters — developing new tools, new understandings, and new relations. Not insularly disconnected, but connected in a more rich and stunning array of ways.

If there are presently great forces allied against the deepening complexities of the internet era we should be unsurprised, but also undaunted. When presidents, politicians and chiefs of police urge the dismantling of the internet, the repossession or forcible backdooring of every phone and device now grabbed by the masses it’s clear they’re being pressed up against the inescapable reality that complexity is anathema to power and control. But the explosion of culture, connection and code that has been unleashed in the last couple generations has incredible momentum. Our rulers may of course yet succeed in demolishing it, in banning general purpose computing as they want and expending great energy to twist the decentralizing tendencies back into a centralized panopticon, but their victory is hardly assured.

The interplay of our tools can grow complicated beyond any single person or political body’s ability to control — just as is true with our relationships — but this can be a good thing. Anarchists should align ourselves with the uncontrollable.


It must be admitted that a handful of primitivists have caught onto the contradictions attendant to dismissing technology in terms of rigidity and complexity. But some of their responses have been even more horrifying.

Embracing the mainstream definition of “technology” as any means of doing things, some primitivists have let their bile and the momentum of countless narratives run away with their sense and openly concluded in various manners that we should reject attempts to expand our avenues by which to act. Because doing things is itself wrong. Or because the act of trying to find more ways of doing things is wrong. Or because seeking to act outside a strict script is deplorable. Or because trying to exercise more ‘control’ over your tools or shaking fingers and thus have more options in life is the same as trying to ‘control’ other people by removing their options.

In these approaches agency itself is set up as the enemy of primitivism. This often comes with a strong embrace of an essentialistic “human nature”, or role that we are obliged to fill.

Conscious thought? Deliberation? Inquiry? Creative exploration of paths? These are taken as violations or perversions from our set path. Thinking, reflection itself, is taken as a corrupting tendency that must be rejected because it can lead bad places. In this frame of mind the only “real freedom” is to turn ourselves into limited and simple automatons — animals that never lift their heads to think beyond the immediate to engage with wider context or make informed choices. A kind of Orwellian freedom from freedom. This is often closely tied to anti-intellectual currents within the scene. In particular an intensely reactionary tendency that abandons and derides the intellect and diligent consideration as useless dead-ends. This current is obviously fascistic and closely mirrors the patterns in fascism’s historical development. But its precise language of surrender is tailored to anarchist language.

“We’ve tried using technology and look at the mess we’re in nonetheless” logically becomes “we’ve tried thinking about things and look at the mess we’re in nonetheless.” Thinking is seen as hopeless and totally ineffective, a masturbatory waste of time that can only lead one down false paths. A rejection of technology is inevitable from this perspective. Not just smartphones but music, language, tactics, strategy, etc. The corruption of large parts of the primitivist scene to anti-civ nihilism has been the inevitable result.

Of course there are still many who don’t fetishize the undeath of immediatism and don’t entirely or openly embrace the obligation to follow some biological script. But they often still inherit and invoke teleological notions in ways that add up to the same thing — personifying unthinking natural systems as having fundamental orientations or goals in themselves that must be respected. To alter a river’s course is violence against the sacred, and thus beavers are denying the “freedom” of the river. Since sacredness acts as a cognitive stop there’s no point in teasing apart the contradictions or arbitrary distinctions this sort of thinking engenders. A lot of hunter gatherer societies are animists, after all, and so it’s a short step for your local oogle to suddenly start talking in terms of the spirits of things and how anything he doesn’t like is “disrespectful” to fictitious entities in his head. How does one determine just what those spirits want? Well outside of rituals to promote an arbitrary consensus perspective through social pressures, there’s no answer. To appeal to science in anything less than shallow and opportunistic ways is to invoke yet another castigated demon.

I have little patience or hope for those ensnared in this worldview. They cannot be reached. And I illuminate this tendency merely as a precautionary reductio ad absurdum for those not yet pushed near its event horizon by a need to justify bad associations with “technology”. There is sadly no reaching those who deny and reject thought itself.


“Okay,” say some of the anti-civ folks, “fine fine fine, we admit that technology is a thorny subject and maaaybe there’s a place for you nerds with your windmills and wifi routers in the ruins. But surely we can all agree that the entire edifice of our existing world is the product of a single horrific leviathan, a genocidal chain-reaction set off in prehistory with the mistake of agriculture and that is as unsustainable as it is totalitarian.”

There is a degree of truth to this tale.

The moment the last Ice Age ended the archaeological record we have sees a veritable explosion of population, agriculture and cities. As a consequence new, larger scale power structures became possible, characterized by more persistent relations. And through various means of conquest such organisms eventually grew to dominance and replicated around the world. But the story isn’t as clean-cut as the conventional Primitivist narrative. In particular, the claim that large numbers of people associating in one place (cities) inescapably equates oppression is tenuous at best.

We know a lot more now than Zerzan and Perlman did back in the 70s, and there wasn’t some 1:1 instantaneous relation between the advents of agriculture, cities and large scale social hierarchies in the archaeological record. There was agriculture in various senses without cities, cities without agriculture, cities and agriculture without hierarchy. At best there’s so far been a tendency towards certain associations, but the precise causality is blurry to say the least. Without access to the actual historical mechanisms it’s hard to claim there are no alternatives. Additionally there are relatively few truly distinct strands of empire in the historical record, so we don’t have fully separable case studies. And the scant handful of millennia since the ice age hasn’t presented more than a few iterations of these macroscopic organisms and their lifecycles — not enough time to draw any clear or solid rules about the phase space of possible configurations.

It’s true that with the surpluses and stores of agriculture you can sustain larger ruling classes and marauding hordes. The emergence of macroscopic power structures focused on permanent enslavement over larger and larger regions rather than occasional raiding — of persistent abuse rather than intermittent — was connected with the emergence of persistent social contact and agriculture. But there were thousands and thousands of years in which the ties binding city, agriculture, and hierarchy hadn’t been normalized. From findings in the Levant we know that plants were being systemically cultivated as far back as twenty thousand years ago. Much more history has been lost in the Amazon and Sub-Saharan Africa thanks to their modern climates; who is even to say what existed during the supposed hunter-gatherer period of the ice age. But the moment the ice caps started to retreat incredibly large populations came together in Britain to explore astronomy, contorting themselves to achieve the cultural complexities of large scale society even without agriculture. Great plains Native Americans would voluntarily come together in vast numbers, straining for the benefits of greater connectivity despite the limits of the land. Similarly the early pastoralist city of Catolhyuk had a population orders of magnitude above Dunbar’s Number and was notably egalitarian. Starkly egalitarian city societies without evidence of authority can be found throughout the archaeological record. From Cayonu’s social revolution 9000 years ago that lasted two thousand years to the highly advanced Harrapans contemporaneous with the empires on the Nile, Tigris and Eurphrates.

Until recently the historical record has been almost exclusively written by the most bloodthirsty conquerors and their perspectives are a terrible foundation for analysis. But even what record they left is clearly riddled with indications of exterminated resistant societies and maroons/pirate utopias.

The impulse to nevertheless write these missing chapters of our history out because they didn’t “win” fundamentally mistakes what power and anarchy are. Just because one complex of power relations managed to plant its flags around the world doesn’t mean the anarchistic currents it tried to digest in the process were in any sense vanquished. The presence of a flag or the locals now wearing western clothing doesn’t in any sense equate the victory of empire.

We live in a more highly connected global society to be sure but there are deep contestations over the degree and nature of its structure. These contestations, these tensions, have grown incredibly complex as everyone on the planet has joined in pitched battle. There are a great many swirling strategic advances and defeats happening all around us.

The fact that we have increased our interconnectivity and cultural complexity — whether through strands carrying the coercive imprint of neoliberalism or on our own terms in the other direction in ways that resist power dynamics as with Somali communities hacking together cellphone networks or Congolese villagers and nomads DIYing radio networks to collaborate to suppress marauders and rapists — does not equate surrender to an imperial logic.

The forces of power are quite showy today, but they are not always necessarily stronger or more repressive in effect. The radical milieu has a bad tendency to appeal to sweeping cynicism and desperation out of fear that anything less cartoonish than “everything is terrible and getting worse” won’t be persuasive at rallying ourselves and others. The abolition of chattel slavery and the transatlantic slave trade? A meaningless spectacle! Everyone knows wage labor in sweatshops etc around the world is so much worse! And the prison population is larger in real terms, even if radically smaller in percentage! We end up aggressively, rabidly blind to improvements. As others have noted, this fetishization often leaves us befuddled and incapable of response when we start winning.

It’s a bad idea to take the ostensible “reach” or “size” of an empire as a measure of its strength and oppression. The size of a patch of color on a map is no indication of its power. Just as often it is the case that “the mountains are high and the emperor is far away”; for all their spectacle of might ‘larger’ empires are often more ephemeral. Indeed a world government could well be an improvement over the 200 or so interlockingly viciously competitive, redundant and locally-attentive nationstates we have today. Better to have distant and confused bureaucrats than the personal attention of small town cops. Regime or system collapses, when they come, are often reorganizations to be more efficient at protecting and deepening power relations themselves. Civil war between fractured fiefdoms has long been a great means to re-strengthen the game theoretic conditions used to justify power. The general computational efficiencies of decentralization can mean things like Rwanda’s genocide being more efficient than that of the Third Reich. When the Roman Empire fell the Vandals actually governed their sections of the old empire more effectively.

While the modern nationstate ecosystem is unparalleled in many horrific aspects, our highly connected mass society has also been incredibly conducive to anarchistic forces in culture and infrastructure. All the more potent for being explicitly conscious of their intentions and vigilant in pursuit of more anarchistic ends than mere egalitarianism.

Yes, technological advances have upped the stakes in the conflict between power and freedom. And “city culture” can be blamed insofar as it provides people the connections and depth of experience necessary to develop technologies. But the historical arc of “civilization” hardly represents a single beast but a complex battlefield of differing forces.

Viewing history in terms of the development of a singular “city-culture” that bundles in a dozen things is in so many ways a tale invented to clean things up in hindsight. It obscures the more salient degrees of freedom and tensions that existed in prior eras and wraps up a vast array of historical dynamics with a single relatively teleological bow.

If civilization is just any tendency for people to aggregate in large numbers it’s hard to assign any negative value to that. And disingenuous to claim that the macroscale power structures that dominate today are the inherent result of such.

The wild dishonesty of primitivist ideologues making pie-in-the-sky claims about hunter gatherer societies has already been widely noted. It’s no fun shooting fish in a barrel when they retreat to claiming magical sources of knowledge. But it must be said that if our hunger for much larger communities has brought into greater relief the old psychologies of dehumanization and selfishness that have spawned violence and power relations in nearly all human societies, so much the better. I prefer our enemies and idols be dragged into the daylight where they can be staked dead, rather than let perpetually rustle and lurk behind the interpersonal relationships of small communities from whom we have little alternative or escape.

Lastly it’s worth touching on the attempted definition or identification of civilization with the importing of resources. As if individual human beings and ecosystems don’t ‘import’ resources — what an arbitrary distinction! This notion of cities as black holes on the map that can only suck from an indentured peasantry is a contentless rhetorical appeal. What cities (or non geographically defined large aggregates of highly-connected people) produce is cognitive/cultural/technological complexity, which is why people consistently voluntarily trade and associate with cities when no tax or threat of force is present. Similarly the appeal to the scale of energy flows on a map is barely worth responding to. Not only is such a distinction intensely arbitrary, but that kind of footprint has been before and is being once again decoupled from the wider social connectivity represented by cities. Are primitivists really going to stop calling points of dense urbanity “cities” or “civilization” when they grow/collect all their food/energy on site in vertical farms? Similarly an anarchy of highly networked but ecologically isolated hollowed out asteroids presses the superficial bundling of impressions that is “civilization”.

We can all agree that environmental devastation is generally negative. And yet it is precisely our push towards wider social connectivity — our globalized perspective — that has finally given us much deeper appreciations for the context of our actions. Hunter gatherers were blind to the externalities of their actions that didn’t result in relatively immediate environmental pressures. The mass networking, expanded knowledge and social options launched by cities offers a much better way.

Yes, this great messy experiment — this orgy of unleashed human thought and options in our relations — has raised the stakes and brought clarity to many perpetual struggles. But dense connectivity, having a multitude of options for collaboration and communication beyond a relatively static tribe, is not the same thing as the rigidity of empire.

We have always lied, withheld information, manipulated, positioned, threatened, and used physical force to constrain and direct each other’s options. Power relations followed us to the cities, but the history of our war with them is not a clean arc. We do not live in the belly of an all-encompassing beast. Rather our lives are found moment by moment on the edges of crossed swords. We are swirling in an intensely complicated and vast battlefield. The great connectivity of cosmopolitan urbanity is one of anarchy’s greatest victories. It has drawn our enemies like locusts. But to retreat, fall apart and scatter to the wind — to be run down and cornered alone once again by more attentive power relations in small tribes with fewer avenues of escape — is to abandon all hope or pretense of resistance.

Our Core Desires

The most frustrating thing about debate in terms like “civilization” and “technology” is that it confines our discourse to a very high level of macroscopic abstraction. And this naturally obscures deeper or more fundamental arguments over values and goals. I dislike this mode of theorizing immensely because it avoids a more direct or honest grappling between different perspectives on ethics and motivations, often to disingenuous effect.

For example when primitivists spew invective about “specialization” what they’re effectively targeting is diversity. All of us specialize, that’s the nature of individuality and subjectivity. Our experiences, our interests and knowledge bases inherently diverge insofar as we have any agency, any creativity, any inquiry, any latitude to roam. And it is through interacting that we benefit from others’ differences and uniquenesses. There will always be some things we can only accomplish in collaboration. So when primitivists sweepingly claim that it’s specialization that makes modern technology bad, they’re implicitly asserting that a certain type of “individuality” — self-sufficient autonomy — is better than another type of “individuality” — intellectual agency. That negative freedom is good and positive freedom bad. But all of these fundamental dynamics are hidden underneath heavily framed and leveraged examples. The full ramifications of such a sweeping allegiance to anti-specialization are hidden from first glance. That’s the nature of this kind of discourse.

The Problem with technology is that it “mediates” our interaction with reality, someone declares. But the air, photons, our skin, our cortical neurons, etc don’t? — It’s too late, this new rationalization for opposing technology has been grasped. And now that person finds themselves locked into the logical ramification of their position. What is mediation but chains of filters or processes? What is abstract thinking or pondering, but precisely this: interceding in the normal causal sequence of stimulation and reaction. Thinking is the problem! Doing due diligence rather than reacting immediately! Death to thinking! Death to the meta-abstraction inherent in consideration and judgement! What we want is lives lived in the absolute present! Fuck making plans! No considering anything in depth or at length! Ultimately the most important things you should value is “directness” and “immediacy”! Anything else is just disconnected fluff! By painting the barriers and inefficiencies we happen to grapple with in our particular context with a broad stroke (“mediation”) the primitivist undergoes a kind of ideological collapse until their ultradense framework allows no escape, no further cognitive motion or critique. Obviously, as psychological advice within a limited context, a greater degree of grounding or awareness of the present can be useful, but when people try to build full-fledged philosophies out of “living in the moment” the only result is death worship. A rock “lives in the moment” — the moment I prod it it moves. It is the mental recursion, the internal modeling, the exploration of possibilities before acting, the knowledge of broader context, that gives us agency.

There are quite significant normative statements being glossed over in different primitivist analyses. Sweeping claims and associations quickly grow into a dense thicket, both giving cover for and boxing people into absurd positions, all while the underlying roots are left unexamined.

What do we or should we most value or desire at core?

Primitivists are prone to trotting a litany of claims about the lives of hunter gatherers. They were happier. They were super healthy Adonises. They had sex all the time. They even saw the moons of Saturn with their bare eyes. It’s like a commercial for a new toothpaste. If they could find a way to claim primitivism will make people’s penises bigger I’m sure they’d try.

These claims can of course be disputed — in terms of how cherry-picked their examples are, how inherently specious anthropological accounts of ‘happiness’ are, how they cavalierly dismiss horrors like hunger, and to what degree primitive life’s success along these metrics can be superseded through other means — but I think this is the wrong approach. I don’t really care whether living as a primitive will give me a bigger cock. Why should we care about these superficialities? If mere happiness was the totality of our aspirations we could simply hook ourselves up in vats of heroin.

What do we value or desire at the root of our ethics/motivation? What do we desire to desire, or desire to desire to desire?

Even if happiness is something that we desire or should desire, is it ALL we want or should want? And if not happiness is there something else inherent to the being of anyone capable of examining and restructuring their desires — some kind of natural prescription that we might follow or revolt against to our doom? This is a harder question because it requires an identification, a settling on some particularly relevant definition of what we should identify with or what we should value.

Our brains have changed over the last two million years — even the last ten thousand — childlike traits like inquisitiveness emphasized and extended. A long arc towards fighting off the relative deadness and complacency of adulthood. Humans are at present a weird inseparable jumble of Pleistocene creature and radically new stuff; we are a number of contradictions physiologically with no underlying objective directive baked in.

Those who can conceive of nothing beyond a very superficial naturalistic fallacy might say that humans are defined by serving some niche role as gears in an broader machine/ecosystem. But how do we go about determining what that role is from the vast variety of possible reads on it?

The ‘purpose’ of humanity might equally well be taken to be to serve as a cleansing virus — getting in a long-overdue mass extinction event so evolution can be sped up (there is after all no ecological imperative towards equilibrium). Or maybe the neotenic arc we’ve taken in retaining our childlike inquiry and creativity is an evolutionary catastrophe utterly at odds with the broader biosphere and we should all stop thinking, stop exercising our childlike inquiry, or even just kill each other off! Or maybe we’re the whole point of the sudden singularity of this Phanerozoic eon, a way for life to jump off this planet in a kind of ecological succession on the grandest scale, spinning up asteroids, seeding comets, rebuilding Mars from desolation, and turning the stars green.

Or maybe the relevant category isn’t what mere ecological niche we fill, but our existence as striving minds, dynamic neural networks modeling the world around them — as children struggling not to be vanquished by the sedentary, dying circuits of adults. Honestly I think this one rings the strongest. As inquiring, engaged, creative minds we don’t just ignore limitations, we’ve actively resisted and overcome them for as long as we have existed. Indeed creativity and inquiry seem in so many ways to lie at the core of liberty, of thinking, of existing. And for most of history the creatives, the scientists and the like have been situated in positions of resistance to power. Occasionally power structures learned how to eat them or incorporate them, but inevitably these methods fail and you get major politicians on tv demanding the effective abolition of science or the internet.

My point with these examples is we need to be clear about what sort of perspective or motivation we’re appealing to. And how that shakes out. It’s not enough to make broad references to “happiness” or “the earth”.

And yet — like Marxism — Primitivism largely ducks addressing our foundational ethics head-on; it avoids making any concrete arguments for why we should value the things it appeals to. The idea being that its target audience will probably have accumulated some loose positive associations with the things it invokes (green things feel good!) and so appealing to them should be good enough. But note that this is a decidedly non-radical approach.

And all the arguments in the world that technology or civilization may have certain downsides are entirely beside the point if those downsides are in different areas from one’s most core values.

My most core value is vigilance. I don’t see how one can speak of any sort of coherent ethics or care without it. In fact it was vigilance that attracted me to the arguments of primitivism two decades ago — concern with the lack of due diligence and consideration to the dynamics and externalities of our industrial society. But at the end of the day what primitivism ultimately represents is an abandoning of vigilance. The world of the permanent collapse is world in which our inquiry into the universe — the depth of our engagement with nature — can never progress past a certain level. A world in which the array of means (technologies) we might consider are permanently and starkly limited. In which we are cut off from the richness of most others’ thoughts and confined to tiny prisons of localism.

These deep tradeoffs to its prefigurative world are horrifying enough, but the primitivist ideology that has shaken out to defend that prescription bends inescapably towards a vicious anti-intellectualism.

Distilled, primitivism is the very opposite of radical thinking. In its reactionary embrace of an Orwellian negative freedom implicitly centered around a biological essentialism it has mutated into a mockery of anarchism. The portrait of “freedom” as some unperturbed static natural state of being to be defended bears only the loosest of linguistic ties with the positive freedom — the freedom to — of anarchy. What the popular notion of collapse represented in Jensen’s “Endgame” — where almost all technological options are irrevocably banished — really presents is the ultimate prison. One so absolute as to need no further guards.

In this we must recognize primitivism as functionally serving to carry the tradition of domestication and sedentary life to its apex: a final desperate attempt to exterminate the rich Cambrian explosion of lush cultural and intellectual complexity that accompanied increased social connectivity and options in affinity. An extinction event unparalleled in the history of consciousness. The permanent loss of incalculable cultural and intellectual ecosystems.

And for what? A sedate lifestyle of immediatism, of comfortably consistent conditions. Longer chains, bigger cages. Superficial ameliorations at the cost of all further advances in freedom in the longterm. There’s a word for people who trade away all hope of the infinite in return for immediate pleasures, the very people who popularized “in the long term we’re all dead”… they’re called liberals.

Yes, freedom implies risk and danger. But the perpetual security promised by primitivism is a nightmare irreconcilable with anything capable of calling itself anarchist without choking. Coffins are made “human sized,” our lives should be lived bigger than that.

Civilizational Collapse

It must be said that I nevertheless occasionally happen upon the most relatable of primitivists. The sort of person persuaded not by mysticism or a deathlike hostility to complexity or thought itself but mostly by pragmatism and despair. Whose embrace of primitivism or anti-civ reflects not an anti-intellectualism, but a sincere analysis that sees no alternative.

“I hate thinking about it,” yet another burnt-out punk confides to me over bourbon. “Every time I glance around at the world all I see is death.”

And surely, yes, rampant ecocide continues largely unabated. But simple narratives have a kind of overwhelming pull. It becomes easy to pattern-match everything within their framework. The same triggered mental circuits, again and again and again. Eventually we get so lost deep in these well-worn ruts they feel like a vise. They become so painful — the feeling of being trapped so deep — that we develop an aversion to vigilantly pushing through. To collecting more data, considering alternate pictures or hypotheses. The moment something starts to remind us of the imprisoning narrative we wince away from it, implicitly accepting it rather than critically engaging with it.

But here’s the plain fact of the matter: We’ve explored very little.

Human history so far has been unimaginably brief when viewed on the scales of different social evolutionary cycles. It has also been in some ways a single history. This obliges both a certain amount of hesitancy when it comes to inferring anything and a certain amount of diligence. We are not able to set up a few hundred completely separate Earths and re-run the end of the ice age and the advent of large scale societies. We have only one Earth. This makes it all the more imperative we get things right, that we take the best possible path. And part of that means doing all our homework. Not falling back on easy defaults or simple stories like primitivism trades in, but proactively considering as many possibilities as we can.

Who knows what random parameters would spin out differently were we to clone a hundred prehistoric Earths. What teleologies or “deterministic” accounts of history would crumble away, revealed as so much just-so storytelling after the fact. It seems likely much would.

Whatever may get printed on Boeing pamphlets there isn’t some objective and singular path of technological “progress.” History is filled with chance occurrences and random walks down the available avenues. While in the broadest terms we can speak of a tendency for technological creativity to create more available means and there are some sequential dependencies to what technologies get invented, there are usually many many paths. And the social-infrastrutural progressions that happened to play out — like tapping fossil fuels like crazy — are not inherent tradeoffs. I referenced Augustin Mouchot’s solar steam engine earlier, and its eclipse by both a decrease in coal prices thanks to British imperial conquest and a French-British treaty. Suffice to say that had an anarchist revolution succeeded back then, or even had the vagaries of geopolitics spun out differently we would have taken a different path. There are countless examples of such happenstance throughout the histories of technological development. Sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse.

One can easily spin out alternate paths we might have taken to get from the ice age to information technologies had we developed and stuck to an anarchist ethos back in prehistory:

People collaborate into large cities, horticulture and pastoralism provide the foundation, then aquaducts and plumbing technology — as the egalitarian and peaceful Harrappans were immediately inclined towards — lead to city gardens and more sustainable irrigation. Sanitary city conditions lead to plummeting child mortality which (as we’ve seen around the world) rapidly leads to stable populations and dramatically differing concepts of relations towards children which helps prevent hierarchical abuse feedback loops ingraining slaver mindsets. The lack of rapid population imbalances and consequent warring leads to longer time preferences and less pressure to grow food at any cost, which leads to saner controlled experimentation surrounding crop practices. Metallurgy is developed in a competitive and egalitarian environment of more DIY backyard shop styles that never provides the startup coercion necessary to concentrate knowledge. Written language emerges from the mathematics of studying astronomy, weather, engineering, exploration, and keeping accounts in a world where tribal reputation mechanisms have trouble scaling past Dunbar. We get glassmaking and lenscrafting very early which leads to solar and all of modern physics. As well as the dramatic advancements in mathematics to go with it, and ancillary insights in biology and chemistry. Glassmaking — the mere artisanal heating of sand — is so profoundly important to the leaps of the last few hundred years I could geek out on it for an entire piece at least as long as this one. But suffice to say a more deliberative and scientific world has less pressure and capacity to extract and burn fossil fuels before realizing their impact. In such a world without governments murdering scientists, closing off research and making proclamations like “we do not do jewish physics”, fundamental research would move a hell of a lot faster, while the absence of huge command economies and capital accumulations mean industry and large scale infrastructure would move slower.

We may not have a direct window to that particular alternate universe, but we don’t have a window to any other universes. And it’s dangerous as fuck to infer too much from just our own. It’s the conservative fallacy in fact, wherein one assumes that what is or has been must be basically all that is possible. Such stunning and terrifying arrogance.

The point is that unending refrains of, “How would you anarchist nerds ever have wifi routers without slave mines for Coltan in the Congo?” are ridiculously, *militantly* obtuse framings. Coltan for instance is available from many sources around the world, the Congo representing a tiny percentage, the only reason certain sites see vast ecological destruction or human suffering is social context. And rare indeed is the resource that had no easy to access surface deposits. The vast mines of this world exist in large part because our rulers wanted to retain materials that had been harvested for useless sudries rather than recycle and repurpose them. Gold is useful in consumer electronics, but so little is needed in comparison to the amount wasted as arbitrary signs of wealth. Sufficient electronics to launch an information age could be made using copper easily harvested from surface deposits thousands of years ago. There are many different ways of making semiconductors, batteries, solar panels and the like, many alternative forms requiring different resources. There’s no reason to suspect that the approaches that are economical in a world with titanic amounts of force and capital would be similarly economical without. When engineers design technologies they are guided by what resources have been made economically optimal, so if the authoritarian government of China has bulldozed its citizens’ land and driven down the price of certain rare earths then research into tools utilizing those rare earths will proceed faster than research into far less destructive alternatives. To claim that social structures and dynamics have no impact on the progression of technologies is insane. And radical changes to our social structures would cause radical changes to our technologies.

The tendency to sweepingly dismiss all green tech as “similar in kind” and ignore orders of magnitude of differences in impact or relevancy is a widespread infection. But what it resembles most is the sort of desperate incantation to preserve one’s narrative we mock with “but jet fuel can’t melt steel beams”. Ratios matter. It matters when we reduce away the work of a hundred people to just one person (or spread out among many people until it’s a trivial chore). And, yes, actually a lot of green tech offers dramatic improvements, not merely green capitalist obscuring of the real costs. The people working on green tech aren’t all idiots or malicious conspirators.

Primitivists love to present a hierarchy whereby information technologies are only available to a very small number of people thanks to the suffering and colonial enslavement of a great many. But the reality is almost everyone on this planet has a cellphone now; billions have smartphones. The enthusiasm of small villages in Africa setting up low-impact DIY wind turbines to generate electricity for their own purposes, must be distinguished against the many orders of magnitude of unnecessary waste in the first world. Primitivism so often functions as a motte and bailey fallacy, whereby legitimate environmentalist arguments against the vast destructiveness of our present ridiculous and authoritarian infrastructure are suddenly magically extended into arguments against all possible technology — never quite making an argument for how the waste and destruction is supposed to inevitably creep back in.

Invariably an allusion to political reformism is made when you point out avenues by which our infrastructure and commodity use could be changed while retaining and deepening our technological capacity. But such a comparison to reformism is inane; political power is a different beast entirely. The psychology involved in controlling other people is dramatically distinct from the psychology involved in giving them more possibilities. We have good reason to expect control to continue striving for more control. But capacity is different from control. Technology — in the sense of means — doesn’t dominate minds, it extends what they can do. You really have play some extremely dubious postmodern shellgames or get lost in crude psychological appeals to avoid that reality.

Similarly desperate are the “growth in a finite system” refrains. The Earth is most emphatically not a closed system, and this fact underpins the very existence of the biosphere. Our ecosystems would not exist without constantly taking in solar energy from without. In the last fifteen years we’ve been arguing about this solar technology has blown right through every allegedly ‘fundamental’ engineering barrier. Meanwhile experts agree that we already have sufficient technology to mine asteroids and — aware of this as well as many asteroids with such abundances of rare metals as to crash global markets or create near post-scarcity — billionaires have been investing in asteroid mining companies. Imagine every mine on the planet shuttering, every mountain top removal project packing up. But again, like every other major technological development going back to satellites, the only response primitivists can muster is to say “science fiction” as sneeringly as possible.

The reality is that the collapse of civilization in a permanent Endgame sense is not guaranteed in the slightest. In fact while there is much that is brittle about our current infrastructure, it is the supposed guarantee of civilization’s collapse that has grown increasingly brittle. Collapsists love to rattle off the array of peaks or potential catastrophes as though multiple arguments that are interrelated are stronger than one. It would only take the maturation of a single technology to derail the whole thing. Get cheap energy from fusion or solar panels and you can spend that energy to process and recycle metals, averting peak metal in the process. Get cheap metals and harvesting wind, solar, etc suddenly becomes trivial.

An Endgame collapse is certainly a possibility worth considering seriously, but it is not an inevitability. It is also a possibility we must fight to our dying breaths.

In public primitivists are always quick to retreat to the claim that they don’t want to kill seven billion people, there’s just literally nothing we can do to stop such an unprecedented holocaust. What nonsense. Seven billion people is such an astronomical number of people that even the tiniest glimmer of a chance to derail such gigadeath by saving civilization should surely occupy our every waking moment. And press them on this, start talking about liquid fluoride thorium salt reactors (impossible to meltdown, short halflife of products, no utility in making warheads, useful way to get rid of thorium already naturally poisoning the Earth’s surface in many places) or the like and very quickly a lot of them will revert to angry declarations that they’d blow up any possible fixes to the collapse.

This response should be highly illustrative of just how paper thin and superficial the fig leaf covering their genocidal misanthropic aspirations are. Primitivism is just another Marxism where you let “inevitable” material conditions do your slaughtering and gulaging for you.

Even as bad as an unparalleled holocaust and retreat to an inescapable and monotonous primitive Eden would be, what is actually likely to emerge would be much worse. It was once common to bandy about “peak metal” and imply that the depletion of rare metals in easily accessible forms wasn’t just going to derail industrial civilization and impede it from ever being rebuilt but would stop all forms of empire. Yet the reality is that things like steel would remain, casting us not into the era of hunter gatherers but instead a permanent unending version of the middle ages. And what we will likely see instead of a singular collapse — what any honest primitivist admits to themselves these days — is instead a series of endless catastrophes. There will be no bandaid ripping past which the survivors finally get a measure of relief. The fall of some empires will mean the likely rise of other empires, with different characteristics perhaps, but similar power relations. While some aspects of our world are incredibly fragile, there is presently enough redundancy for the same systems to start up again and be much worse, provided any room for humanity on the planet remains. Brazil for instance is almost entirely run on hydroelectric power. While information technologies and many other liberatory technologies would go away large industrial societies are not going to disappear. A limited number of people hiding the cracks between various Roman Empires is hardly all that enticing of an anarchist vision.

Ecological Collapse

While the end of civilization, anarchistic or not, is hardly guaranteed. Ecological collapse is already a sure thing, an already happening thing. The only question is how bad we’ll let it get. And in this abandoning science and proactive technological grappling is a whole bunch of things that end in -cidal.

It’s not as simple as “just kill industrial civilization and then the biosphere will get better for human life”. Our biosphere isn’t magic and it bares no allegiance to anything besides physics. There is no inherent orientation to an equilibrium, much less one that’s liveable for humans, or even current terrestrial animals.

I frequently hear green anarchists claim that the solution to global warming is to just stop industrial civilization and let the trees regrow. This is either desperate to the point of delusion or stupendously ignorant of the science of global warming.

Trees temporarily absorb carbon but then promptly re-emit it when they die and decompose or burn. The carbon in the air right now is utterly beyond the capacity of the earth’s forests at their peak, and it would take too long for trees to capture enough carbon to derail the current feedbacking. Our oceans are usually the vast vast vast majority of the carbon capture in the normal cycle, and they’re stressed beyond their capacity now. Additionally trees can actually *increase* global warming because they’re darker and thus absorb more solar radiation. Indeed basically any increase in the size of boreal forests right now would *contribute* to global warming. This is one of the big dangers, actually, that forests will spread in the northern hemisphere as temperatures rise and cause even greater warming.

The carbon that is now in the air isn’t part of the normal carbon cycle that trees dealt with, it’s carbon that was for hundreds of millions of years locked up in the Earth. The last time it was in the atmosphere the Earth was a dramatically different place, inhospitable to a lot of modern organisms. The only solution that can actually save us from the runaway feedback loops we’ve set off that are releasing methane and the like is to put that carbon back in the earth, back in the rock or similar form. And there is no way to do this without technology and science.

Our only hope is carbon negative technologies — technologies that as a byproduct take carbon out of the atmosphere and into a more permanent form. Thankfully there’s a vast diversity of avenues by which we can do this, many of which are in production and use already. Some rather advanced, some stunningly simple. Algae are what originally pulled the CO2 out of the air over millions of years and made our atmosphere breathable. If the feedback process of global warming continues unabated algae blooms in the ocean risk destroying ocean life and creating toxic consequences. Some of my favorite carbon negative technologies generate algae in controlled systems — before algae blooms in the wild destroy even more — in ways that generates energy. The byproduct being both energy for our technologies and trapped carbon. The calculus is changing as the happenstance technologies that were normalized the last couple centuries change. With carbon negative technologies the more energy we consume, the less CO2 in the atmosphere.

The remaining work at this point is making them even more efficient, figuring out which ones are most optimal, and turning them from technologies to infrastructure (ie widespread production/use). The latter requires some social struggle, but is doable. Primitivists are always accusing scientists and engineers of rushing technologies into development without due diligence, but when we exercise due diligence developing green technologies they pretend as though the delay means they’re fundamentally not possible.

Indeed only through the global perspective possible with modern science can we begin to contextuallize our actions and their consequences.

Many anti-civ folk are now starting to concede this, but the point is no fringe or marginal one. Massive amounts of toxins and elements are currently locked up in products or infrastructure, to throw up our hands and walk away is to let them leak out. It’s not just shitty nuclear plants and biowarfare labs.

And if you expect there to be time and an increase in the popularity of revolutionary perspectives such that revolutionary scientists can help with some decommissioning you’re not talking about an inevitable collapse that we’d have no power to avert, you’re talking about a deliberative and intentional social change. So why not go further?

We have the capacity not just to avert global warming and ocean acidification but to reclaim the Sahara and restore the megafauna that hunter gatherers killed off. (Contrary to the myth that primitive peoples were somehow aware of ecological externalities beyond their immediate contexts, recent global statistical analyses have conclusively settled that hunter gatherers were responsible for the ecological destruction of the late Quaternary). With the broader insight and perspective provided by science and global communication we finally have an opportunity to  repair the mistakes of past generations as we move asymptotically towards greater understanding of our world and thus greater agency within it.

That word, agency, is the core of this divide between anarchism and primitivism.

Primitivists would rather write agency our of the conversation. They want to pretend that we have No Alternative but collapse, no real choices or options to be expanded or diligently explored. Their opposition to technology and cosmopolitanism make perfect sense when the very notion of expanding our choices is taken to be incomprehensible. Physical freedom? What nonsense, you can’t be oppressed by nature! What’s happened to get someone to such a ludicrous position is a divorcing of oppression from anything concrete. Now oppression isn’t controlling people or constraining their options in life, it’s just anything that conjures bad feels. Freedom? Well there’s no such thing really. Just the freedom from thought, the freedom from choice, complexity, vigilance, etc.

This kind of obsession with the delusion of certainty is the hallmark of depression. The desperate hunger for the pain of having no real options. Many commentators have noted the turn of our milieu towards treating depression, anxiety and other mental health issues as the essential experience of our radicalism. We bond over sharing in it; and end up fetishizing and reinforcing these ailments.

Only in such light primitivism can pretend to be coherent with anarchism.

But to hunger for the genocide and ecocide of a collapse is to mistake mental health issues for radicalism. Misanthropic edginess for critique. Emotional states for vigilant pursuit of root dynamics.


What I’ve sketched out here is decidedly not comprehensive — and intentionally so. Primitivism benefits from a vast array of different arguments that end up multiply overlapping each other in an ever-changing patchwork. As with “200 Proofs Earth is Not a Spinning Ball” what’s important to realize is that the individual arguments don’t actually have much importance. One could spend years responding to everything Zerzan has written, systemically breaking down his arguments and getting into citation wars, but those who have come to identify as primitivists then happily shift their focus to other writers with alternative arguments. Once one becomes invested in the trappings of the ideology, the community, the culture, the mythos, the fantasies… there’s little avenue left for changing one’s mind. “Anti-civ” and “post-civ” were supposed to provide more freedom from the ideological prison of primitivism, but the end result has been a larger more amorphous ideological prison, still chained to a center of mass defined by the same old primitivist mistakes.

My intention here has instead been to provide an overview of and gateway to critiques that those in the anti-civ milieu are typically unaware of. (Everyone at this point is well aware of primitivism’s vulnerability on trans issues and ableism.) What’s been so frustrating to a lot of anarchist hackers, scientists, and former primitivists is that the points I’ve covered are blindingly obvious to us. But primitivist milieu in its relative memetic isolation has grown a thick shell of uncritically embraced arguments and claims that extend in many many fields and make debate a herculean task.

It must be admitted that this kind of ideological catastrophe is a side effect to the positive feedback loops in complexity unleashed by modern communications technologies. We exist in an early stage where it’s still easy for certain positions to quickly accumulate reinforcing cruft until they pass an argument-complexity event horizon that makes them basically unchallengeable. Where perspectives can win not through good arguments but tangled ones; often shifting around between endless fallbacks or implicitly complex but explicitly simple appeals to “common sense” notions.

Arguing with primitivists is a process almost identical to arguing with statists. Tear down one claim and they fall back on a hundred others. Tear down those and they start again invoking the stuff you’ve already demolished. Try to lay out everything at length and they appeal to how much more has been written by statists, given their superior numbers. Your argument is now too long to read, or too technical and inaccessible. You haven’t directly addressed this specific argument made by this specific person in this specific book. Do that and they declare that person irrelevant. Try to hit general trends in their discourse and they decry that as unfair and disconnected. These protective strategies used by dominant ideologies reflect really basic Manufacturing Consent style techniques where all burden is placed upon alternative or dissident perspectives and they are both expected to persuade with very little space to build complicated responses and to tackle every argument immediately. And whatever you do, no matter how much ground you force them to concede, the conversation always ends with a scoff. Your position is unpopular because my position is common sense among my friends. Or, even sillier, arguments about tone, wherein the dissident is dismissed for not being sufficiently polite and deferential while banging on the locked doors of their dogma.

And then they claim shit like “the existing needs no further defenders” which is just the most absurd heights of sweeping simplification. And of course takes as its starting point the absurd notion that our existing society is anything but hostile to technological development and diversity.

A critical eye towards how technologies are used or the normalization of certain infrastructural forms does not make you “anti-civ” or a luddite, it makes you a conscious human being with basic critical thinking faculties. Primivists do not hold a monopoly on examining tools and infrastructure. But such critical analysis should be extended to everything, including our bodies and our biosphere. Radicalism means rejecting simplistic claims about their “nature”, just as it also means rejecting simplistic narratives about abstractions like “civilization”.

The means we adopt can have corruptive influences, they can bend in certain directions, in laziness we can slip into valuing them as ends unto themselves and discarding our original ends. And certain means can be incoherent with the ends they allege to work towards. Anarchism is founded on the recognition that ends and means are deeply interconnected, albeit not magically one-to-one. Ferretting out these dynamics is valid and important work, and green anarchists have made numerous valid individual points on the ossified infrastructure we are imprisoned by. Covering the Earth’s surface with concrete and asphalt is clearly fucked, as is cutting up the biosphere into tiny pieces, etc, etc. We should obviously be conscious and engaged with the means we choose. We should remove the social and infrastructural systems that deny us agency in our means. But as anarchists our critical engagement with means should reflect a desire to expand freedom, not constrain it, to make ultimately possible more means — infinite means even — not less.

Now one can still dismiss opportunities for a freer future as not worth the risk. And one can entirely reject the underlying desires, ideals and ethics that value to intellectual vigilance and positive freedoms. Such an opinion is a coherent one, at least as much as “liberalism”, but it bares almost no relation to anarchy.

Forget bread, forget cake, forget even the bakery, the only anarchist demand is everything.

September 02 2015


Elevating to the Public Domain

Airfoil lift.

We were talking with reader Noel Taylor about the "Happy Birthday" song case and he made an interesting suggestion:

Instead of say that a work has "fallen into" the public domain or "lapsed into" the public domain, why not say that the work has been "elevated to" the public domain?

Think about it: how did "fall" and "lapse" become our default verbs for talking about the removal of a work's monopoly restrictions?  If anything, it makes sense to say that the restrictions are falling away, like chains falling away, but the work itself is not falling anywhere.  It is unchained, and can now fly free.

So we're going to try saying "elevate to the public domain" from now on, and we hope you'll try it too.  See how much better it makes you and others feel about the work in question!

We've updated the Question Copyright glossary accordingly.



August 11 2015



Freedombox 0.5 Released!

August 7, 2015

We are pleased to announce that FreedomBox version 0.5 has been released! This release comes 7 months after the previous, 0.3 release.

The FreedomBox version 0.5 is available here:

Before using, you should verify the image's signature, see for further instructions:

$ gpg --keyserver hkp:// --recv-keys 0x36C361440C9BC971

$ gpg --fingerprint 0x36C361440C9BC971

pub   4096R/0C9BC971 2011-11-12
      Key fingerprint = BCBE BD57 A11F 70B2 3782
                        BC57 36C3 6144 0C9B C971
uid                  Sunil Mohan Adapa <>
sub   4096R/4C1D4B57 2011-11-12

$ gpg --verify freedombox-unstable_2015-08-06_raspberry-armel-card.tar.bz2.sig freedombox-unstable_2015-08-06_raspberry-armel-card.tar.bz2

(Replace the file names with the version you download.)

Thanks to all who helped put this release together.

More information on this release is available on the wiki:

Major FreedomBox 0.5 Changes:

  • New targets: CubieTruck, i386, amd64

  • New apps in Plinth: Transmission, Dynamic DNS, Mumble, ikiwiki, Deluge, Roundcube, Privoxy

  • NetworkManager handles network configuration and can be manipulated through Plinth.

  • Software Upgrades (unattended-upgrades) module can upgrade the system, and enable automatic upgrades.

  • Plinth is now capable of installing ejabberd, jwchat, and privoxy, so they are not included in image but can be installed when needed.

  • User authentication through LDAP for SSH, XMPP (ejabberd), and ikiwiki.

  • Unit test suite is automatically run on Plinth upstream. This helps us catch at least some code errors before they are discovered by users!

  • New, simpler look for Plinth.

  • Performance improvements for Plinth.

Please feel free to join us to discuss this release on the mailing list, IRC, or on the monthly progress calls:

July 30 2015


Going to Town on Warner/Chappell in the "Happy Birthday" case.

Happy Birthday cupcake.We've written about the Happy Birthday lawsuit here before.  Now it seems the case has reached a turning point -- a "smoking gun" has been found, thanks to research in the files of the pro-monopoly side, Warner/Chappell: a copy of the "Happy Birthday" lyrics from 1922, that is, before the present-day copyright horizon.

The story (courtesy of Hollywood Reporter) is pretty fascinating in itself, but let's go to town on the amazing claim Warner/Chappell seems to be making in response to this new discovery.  After all, what is for, if not going to town on the most absurd claims of the monopoly industry?

What Warner/Chapell seems to be saying is that even if it were found that the song lyrics existed in their current form in 1922 -- that is, earlier than the current "earliest copyright horizon" -- the fact that the 1922 copy of those lyrics might have been, at that time, a possible copyright infringement (which it obviously wasn't, but we'll leave that aside in order to grant the widest possible latitude to Warner/Chapell's argument, for our own entertainment if nothing else) means that maybe the copyrights claimed later in 1935 are somehow still valid.  Or something?

But the mere existence of a version of a work before the horizon means that, even if that copy were in an copyright-infringing state at the time, whatever copyright it was infringing then must, clearly, have expired by now.  Because otherwise, the copyright horizon is not really a copyright horizon.  Unless you live in a world where time runs backwards and sideways, as Warner/Chapell perhaps does.

What this lawsuit really shows is what we've been arguing is the problem with broad information monopoly rights in general: once the state creates a monopoly, it creates a monopolist who owns it -- or in this case imagines themselves to own it -- and that monopolist will fight to the bitter end to keep it, against all reason and all evidence.  There is normally no representative of the public who has as clear and focused an interest in a given monopoly as its putative owner does; we just got lucky in this case that a filmmaker decided to take an interest in this one song.

Who will stand up for all the other songs?



July 11 2015


OpenCog partners with Hanson Robotics to work toward human-like robots

Hanson Robotics, the world’s premier maker of realistic humanoid robot heads and faces, is partnering with the OpenCog Foundation to develop general intelligence for Hanson robots.

Recently relocated to Hong Kong, Hanson Robotics is collaborating closely with Gino Yu’s OpenCog oriented R&D lab at Hong Kong Poly U, as well as with iCog Labs in Addis Ababa.

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